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The Politics of Facts:
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by
WENDY M. ROGOVlN**

"The facts that we dislike we call theories; the theories that we
cherish we call facts."'
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Introduction
The United States Constitution grants sweeping power to make
the nation's laws to one branch of government-the United States
Congress. Except for the partial check of the presidential veto, Congress can pass whatever laws it wishes. But the validity and enforceability of these laws is limited, for that same document places
substantive curbs on Congress's authority. At least since Marbury v.
Madison,2 the federal judiciary and the United States Congress have
struggled over the constitutional boundaries of congressional
activities.
Some of these struggles relate to defining Congress's enumerated
powers, 3 and others to defining the protections afforded individuals by
the Bill of Rights. 4 It is through these and like struggles that the
courts have developed a complex and evolving system of rules governing scrutiny of legislation. The level of scrutiny courts use depends
on, among other factors, the constitutional source of the authority
under which Congress is acting and the countervailing constitutional
right, if any, alleged to have been trammelled.5
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (defining the limits of Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce).
4. E.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (examining congressional authority to pass legislation designed to enforce a provision of the Bill of Rights).
5. For instance, within equal protection jurisprudence there are three separate levels
of scrutiny applied to various cases. Strict scrutiny is applied to some race-based measures;
intermediate-level scrutiny is applied to gender-based legislation; minimum level, or "rational basis" scrutiny, is applied to yet other categories. Even within those three levels of
scrutiny, courts look to the laws with varying degrees of discrimination. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1439-54, 1561-65 (2d ed. 1988) (exam-

ining the varying levels of scrutiny applicable to equal protection cases).
When reviewing legislation to determine whether it is justified by the Commerce
Clause, the court analyzes whether the regulated activity "substantially affects' interstate
commerce." United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995). From the New Deal
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court and several federal
courts have newly circumscribed congressional activity by holding that
in order to withstand constitutional challenge, legislation must be supported by empirical data.6 These cases have been decided in disparate
until Lopez was handed down on April 26, 1995, the minimum level of scrutiny has been
applied to Commerce Clause cases. The Court would defer to congressional regulation of
activity if there was any rational basis for finding that it substantially affected interstate
commerce. ld at 1651 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Presault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981);
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 190 (1968) (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 303-04 (1964))).
Scrutiny of legislative acts also varies depending on which legislature is under review.
Less deference is given to state legislatures than to Congress. TRIE, supra, at 12-13.
6. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority to regulate activity under the Commerce Clause in enacting the GunFree School Zone Act). Justice Souter, in dissent, cautions that the majority in Lopez may
foretell a requirement that statutes "contain explicit factual findings supporting the otherwise implicit determination that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce." Id. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
In Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994),
a divided Court vacated the district court's order of summary judgment and remanded
consideration of the must-carry rules requiring cable systems to transmit local broadcast
television stations. The rules were challenged as violative of the First Amendment rights of
the cable system. Despite "unusually detailed statutory findings," included in the Act itself, id. at 2461, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority that:
[w]ithout a more substantial elaboration in the District Court of the predictive or
historical evidence upon which Congress relied, or the introduction of some additional evidence to establish that the dropped or repositioned broadcasters would
be at serious risk of financial difficulty, we cannot determine whether the threat
to broadcast television is real enough to overcome the challenge to the provisions
made by these appellants.
Id. at 2472. There are two aspects of the context in which Turner was decided that should
be noted. First, it is a case where the standard of review is conducted at the intermediatelevel, and second it is a summary judgment case. Thus it is appropriate that the Court
scrutinize the factual basis for this legislation with a high degree of intensity. Nevertheless,
the Court's decision to vacate and remand is remarkable for the fact that the 1992 Cable
Act was enacted following "three years of hearings on the structure and operation of the
cable television industry." Id. at 2454.
See also, Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding Equal
Protection Clause challenge on grounds that nexus linking means of legislation with its
goal lacked "meaningful factual predicate"); Federal Election Comm'n v. Int'l Funding
Inst., 969 F.2d 1110, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J., concurring) ("The government
must prove that the means chosen are 'substantially related' to achieving 'important' governmental objectives. Without empirical support, the provision will not survive.") (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has upheld an empirical data requirement, but it was in the context of legislation passed by a city, not the United States Congress. Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2319-20 (1994) (requiring individualized determination of a connection between exactions imposed by city and projected impacts of proposed development).
This distinction is an important one, as the right of the federal courts to oversee state
legislation is far less problematic than their authority to supervise the manner in which

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

contexts ranging from equal protection to the First Amendment to the
Commerce Clause.7 However, in each of the decisions in which a
court stated that with proper empirical data the legislation might be
constitutional, other issues are also at play. One might, with good reason, describe the cases as being consistent with the conservative
agenda of today: The rolling back of gender preferences in Lamprecht
v. FCC,8 the resuscitation of the Tenth Amendment and curtailment
of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause in United
States v. Lopez, 9 and the burdening of free speech and reliance on the
free market in Turner BroadcastingSys., Inc. v. FCC10 are all consistent with a conservative agenda.
The identification of a political agenda and the attribution of it to
the judiciary is hardly new. Activist courts have a long and rich history that extends across both sides of the political spectrum. And activism of this sort-requiring factual justification for legislation-is
not new, inherently problematic, nor politically skewed. Throughout
history, facts have been marshalled in support of legislation for political reasons of varying stripe and intensity.' In one sense, the present
reliance on facts to achieve political ends is no different than past infederal legislation is drawn up. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1952) [hereinafter HOLMES, COLLECTED PAPERS] ("I do not think that the
United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress
void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to
the laws of the several States. For one in my place sees how often a local policy prevails
with those who are not trained to national views and how often action is taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was meant to end."). See also TRIBE, supra note 5, at 12-13
n.7.
7. The Commerce Clause states that the Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8. Lamprecht has also been said to mark the return of substantive due process. See
Wendy M. Rogovin, Regulation of Broadcastingin the PublicInterest: On Creatinga Parallel Universe in Which Minorities Speak and are Heard, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 96 (1992).
See also Recent Case, 106 HARV. L. REV. 804, 804 (1993) (characterizing the majority's
decision as example of "how courts can detrimentally affect appropriate legislative policies
when they abandon their appropriate sphere of review and substitute their own judgment
for the combined wisdom of Congress and executive agencies").
9. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). Several commentators have so characterized the Lopez
decision. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Set In as Federalism'sReferee, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1995, at Al; Roger Pilon, It's Not About Guns; the Court's Lopez Decision is
Really About Limits on Government, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at C5.
10. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
11. The use of social science data and empirical evidence by the court is generally
associated with progressive causes. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,
494-95 n.11 (1954) (relying on Kenneth Clarke's much-criticized doll study); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419-20 & n.1 (1908) (Brandeis brief filled with "science" designed to
persuade). For an example of data used towards a conservative agenda, see Plessy v. Fer-
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stances where facts have been used to further ideological goals. But
the present reliance on empirical data as a source of constitutional
authority goes beyond mere result-oriented politics. The ideological
call for facts is cloaked in the apolitical, apparently objective nature of
the facts and so it mystifies the decisionmaking process. Further, the
specific call by the judiciary for empirical data in support of federal
legislation profoundly affects the processes by which Congress legislates and the judiciary reviews congressional legislation.
This Article explores that which empirical data as a factual basis
for legislation offers to the judiciary and the legislature. It examines
the sources of and justifications for a judicial requirement that legislation be supported by empirical data. In doing so, it considers a variety
of its interpretations and applications, the alternatives to empirical
data as support for legislation, and the various forms empirical data
can take.
Although the empirical data requirement has appeared in cases
where the court has applied heightened scrutiny to the challenged legislation, it is most clearly seen in those cases where minimum-level, or
"rational basis," review is applied. In such cases, the departure from
the past practice of extreme judicial deference is most obvious and
significant. Previously, the legal system has not required empirical
data from Congress.'2 Until recently, the hallmark of cases subject to
guson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896) (attributing differences between races to biology, and then
in a logical misstep, to environment).
The social science in Plessy was explicitly repudiated in Brown: "Whatever may have
been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,this finding is
amply supported by modem authority." Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. PAUL L. ROSEN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 30, 154 (1972). See also Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) (incorporating social darwinist Herbert Spencer's theories into law).
Social science is not alone in its ability to be manipulated towards political ends. See
also ROSEN, supra, at 16-19 (discussing uses of historical information for political ends).
12. In the Commerce Clause context, the standard has been that legislation will be
struck down "only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that
the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends." Hodel v. Indiana, 452
U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981) (citations omitted). In equal protection cases subject to the lowest
level of scrutiny, a legislative classification "must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification." Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach
Communications, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993)).
As a practical matter, it is nearly impossible for legislation to withstand constitutional
challenge under strict scrutiny absent proof of a narrowly-tailored nexus between the ends
and the means of the legislation. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court,1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal
Protection,86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1971) (describing standard as "strict in theory but fatal
in fact").
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minimum level review has been great deference to Congress and virtual indifference to the factual basis of federal legislation. Accordingly, there was no need for Congress to articulate a distinction
13
between "political" and "scientific" facts.
However, as Congress is being called upon to support its legislation with empirical data, differentiation between these kinds of facts
may be required. "Political facts" reflect the legislature's perception
of the state of society. "Scientific facts" represent the consensus of
the relevant scientific community as to the state of that which is being
examined. It may be the case that a correct political fact is an incorrect scientific one. 14 Because the legislature does not distinguish between these two kinds of facts, it interchanges scientific and political
facts, and false scientific facts routinely masquerade as accurate political facts. It is this unexplored leap-that a political truth may be a
scientific falsehood-that is implicated by an empirical data
requirement.
If an empirical data requirement is intended to be more than a
mere heightening of judicial scrutiny, or just another method by which
the judiciary may declare laws unconstitutional, it must influence Congress's legislative processes. Accordingly, this Article also considers
how effective various permutations on an empirical data requirement
are at keeping Congress within its constitutional boundaries, given the
15
way in which legislatures and courts actually operate.
Part I of this Article examines an empirical data requirement-its
legitimacy and source. It also sets forth the criteria this Article employs to evaluate the usefulness of empirical data as a constitutional
13. Indeed, in reviewing legislation under rational basis review, judicial deference has
been so extensive that one commentator observed that, if "[t]aken seriously, this conception makes of our courts lunacy commissions sitting in judgment upon the mental capacity
of legislators and, occasionally, of judicial brethren." Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 819 (1935) [hereinafter Felix
Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense].
14. Neither scientific nor political facts can be proven "true" in a metaphysical sense.
Indeed, the word "truth" derives from "good faith" and "truce." Thus, from its derivation,
we see "truth" is merely an agreed upon stopping point in a certain kind of inquiry. See
OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY 606 (2d ed. 1989) ("True ... repr. WGer. *trew, lit. 'having
or characterized by good faith,' deriv, of sb. which is represented by OE. treow, truw,
OHG. triuwa, Goth. triggwa faith, covenant: see TRUCE.") I am indebted to my colleague
Bernard Jacob for pointing this out to me.
15. Professor Mark Thshnet observes that it is incumbent upon "judges attempting to
develop judicially enforceable limitations on congressional power . . . to solve two
problems. First they must explain why such limitations ought to be devised, and second
they must design limitations that courts actually can enforce." Mark Tushnet, Why the
Supreme Court Overruled NationalLeague of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1634 (1994).
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requirement for legislation. In brief, the criteria represent a series of
guiding concerns that need to be addressed before employing an empirical data requirement. These guidelines are designed to ascertain
the usefulness of an empirical data requirement to the legislature and
judiciary in operating within the bounds of the Constitution. In addition, the effect of a given rule on the public's perception of law will
also be considered. In Part II, the Article examines how Congress
goes about finding facts.
The Article then analyzes the efficacy of various ways in Vhich
empirical data might be used to support legislation. It does so mindful
of the criteria set forth in Part I, and given the reality of how Congress
finds facts, as detailed in Part II. Finally, in Part IV, the Article concludes that, for the most part, the empirical data requirement-however framed-represents a radical change in the law governing the
process by which Congress legislates. This transformation in the law,
once unmasked, is not all bad. There are certain benefits to requiring
that Congress legislate based on political facts that are drawn from
scientific ones. For example, such a rule curbs the ability of popular
will to override scientific reason. In addition, by requiring Congress
to express the bases for its legislation, it offers the populace the possibility of more congressional accountability.
However, as the Article demonstrates, an empirical data requirement demands more of Congress than the simple articulation of the
bases of its legislation: It constrains the legislative process by forcing
the legislature to actually demonstrate an empirical basis for its legislation. Given the difficulty of determining the ultimate truth of a scientific fact, and the inappropriateness of the judiciary finding political
facts, this Article concludes that, at best, the empirical data requirement suits only a narrow class of cases that could better be handled by
overtly heightening scrutiny, and at worst represents an illegitimate
grasping of constitutional power by the judiciary.
I.
A.

The Empirical Data Requirement

No Man's Land

Before examining the viability of an empirical data requirement,
it is prudent to address a threshold question: Is an empirical data requirement an unwarranted judicial usurpation of legislative authority,
or simply a method by which the judiciary exercises its authority to
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determine the constitutionality of legislation? 16 The authority of the

federal courts to review federal legislation is not specifically associated with any constitutional principle. 17 Accordingly, there is no single place to turn to for definitive resolution of such questions. Nor
does existing common law guide us as to the specific implementation
of an empirical data requirement.18
An empirical data requirement might be teased out through a requirement that Congress make express formal findings of fact, and
include them in its legislation or the legislative history of its laws.
These findings of fact would show the judiciary the particular empirical data upon which the legislature relied in enacting its law. This
conception of an empirical data requirement might even be consistent
with the minimum-level judicial review of legislation that is applied in

16. Chief Justice Marshall pronounced that "[]udicial power is never exercised for the
purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect...
to the will of the law." Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866
(1824).
For a discussion of Congress's attempts to wrest the authority to review constitutional
cases from the federal courts, and of the Supreme Court's reluctance to speak on the constitutionality of such congressional action, see Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The
Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction,85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 57 n.263 (1990).
17. Indeed, arguments about judicial review have been aptly described as "metaconstitutional." TRIBE, supra note 5, at 61 (defining "metaconstitutional" as meaning that
"the relevant considerations are political, philosophical, and historical in the broadest
sense"). Although it now seems firmly embedded in constitutional jurisprudence, the authority of the federal judiciary to review federal legislation is a "debatable power assumed
in Marbury v. Madison." Id. at 13 n.7. See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN
JUDICIAL REVIEW 10 n.19 (1986).
18. Because of the indeterminacy of the source and limits of federal judicial review of
federal legislation, one could look to federal common law to locate its parameters. But this
too provides little assistance with respect to the legitimacy of an empirical data
requirement.
An empirical data requirement could be legitimized by locating it in United States
Supreme Court precedent. In fact, it could be argued that the empirical data requirement
was anticipated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland when he wrote: "Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421 (1816). For a full discussion of how this test was implemented in McCulloch see G.
EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-35 (1991). It is
not clear that one could locate, in McCulloch, such a requirement. One might argue that
empirical data is needed to show that means are "plainly adapted" to the end goal of the
legislation under review. However, one could also argue that the test in McCulloch specifically prohibits mandating the means by which an end is achieved. Justice Marshall wrote
that so long as the end is constitutional "all means which are appropriate ... are constitutional." McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).
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Commerce Clause cases. 19 In United States v. Lopez 20 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, indicated that congressional findings included in the legislation itself or its legislative history, might
have altered the Court's evaluation of the constitutionality of the legislation under review. 21 Alternative methods of presenting empirical
data include: An amendment to the challenged legislation that includes express formal factual findings,22 or the presence of relevant
empirical data in the text or legislative histories of previous, similar
statutes.
The decision to include facts in legislation rests with the legislature; the judiciary cannot, through an empirical data requirement,
mandate such an action. 23 At present, neither the Constitution nor
any federal statute dictates that legislation include any kind of factual
findings.24 Given the variety of methods in which empirical data
might be included in legislation, that still leaves a substantial grey area
between Congress's authority over its process and the judiciary's authority to protect constitutional rights. It is over this ground that the
judiciary and Congress are engaging in a turf war. This Article attempts to provide the tools needed to mediate that power struggle.

19. Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause is broad and somewhat varied.
For a full analysis of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause and divergent
perspectives on that authority, see Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (comparing the opinions
of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas and Justice Souter). The Commerce Clause
grants Congress the authority to regulate those activities where the regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce. Id. at 1630.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39 for a discussion of Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631-32 (1995).

21. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
22. There was just such an amendment to the legislation struck down in the Lopez
case. It was disregarded by the majority in that case, ostensibly because the government
did not "rely upon the[ ] subsequent findings as a substitute for the absence of findings in
the first instance." Id. at 1632.
23. However, in the appropriate circumstances it can hold legislation unconstitutional
because there are insufficient facts to establish a rational basis for it.
For a discussion of how important it is that proposals to clarify legislative meaning not
impinge on congressional autonomy see Robert A. Katzmann, Bridgingthe Statutory Gulf
Between Courts and Congress: A Challengefor Positive PoliticalTheory, 80 GEo. L.J. 653,
665-67 (1992).

24. The form of federal statutes is only marginally ordained. The only sections of the
United States Code that mandate the form of a statute concern the form of enacting
clauses, the form of resolving clauses, the number of sections, the number of propositions
contained in each section, and the title of appropriations acts. 1 U.S.C. §§ 101-105 (1988).
For a discussion of these requirements, see ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 62-84 (1995) [hereinafter MIKvA & LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS].

1732
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The Source of the Empirical Data Requirement: United States v.
Lopez

In United States v. Lopez, the United States Supreme Court held
that, in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,25 Congress
exceeded its authority to regulate interstate commerce among the
states.26 The Lopez case is of particular interest, as challenges
brought to Congress's legislative power under the Commerce Clause
have been subject to lax judicial scrutiny. Not surprisingly, judicial
review of Commerce Clause cases has not included a requirement that
empirical data demonstrate the ends/means nexus of such legislation.2 7 To the contrary, from the 1930's until Lopez, the only limit
placed on Congress's power to legislate was in cases where the judiciary was unable to recognize that the regulated activity in any way bur28
dened, however indirectly, commerce between the states.
At issue in Lopez was the constitutionality of the Gun-Free

School Zones Act of 1990 which, among other things, made it a federal crime to knowingly "possess a firearm at a place that [an] ...
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone."'29 Alfonso Lopez, Jr., then a 12th-grade student, carried a concealed .38 caliber handgun and five bullets onto the property of the
Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas. He was arrested and
charged with possession of a firearm on school premises in violation of
25. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. V 1993)).
26. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
27. Since 1936, the Supreme Court has only once found congressional action to be
unsupported by the Commerce Clause, and that was in the oft-criticized Nat'l League of
Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (invalidating 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which extended federal minimum wage and hour guidelines to state and local
employees on the ground that states must be free to manage "traditional governmental
functions").
The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and extends to all such commerce be it great or small." NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939) (citations omitted). Such a holding requires the exercise of
some amount of judgment. But the Court's subsequent decisions suggest that the Congress
has been given free rein to regulate not only commerce among the states, but also anything
that affects commerce among the states.
28. The Supreme Court held that a "court may invalidate legislation enacted under
the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional
finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends." Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981) (citations omitted).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988). A school zone is defined in
§ 921(a)(25) as "in, on or within 1000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school."
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Texas law.3 0 The following day, he was charged with violating the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, and the state charges were
dropped. He pled "not guilty" and moved to dismiss the indictment
on the grounds that § 922(q) "is unconstitutional as it is beyond the
power of Congress to legislate control over our public schools."'31 Following the district court's denial of that motion, Lopez was found
guilty and sentenced.3 2 Lopez appealed his conviction and sentence,
renewing his constitutional objection, but not contesting the underlying facts upon which his conviction rested. The Fifth Circuit reversed
his conviction on the grounds that Congress failed to establish, in the
language of the Act, its legislative history, or anywhere else, that
weapons possession within 1000 feet of a school affected interstate
commerce so that federal regulation would be permissible under the
Commerce Clause. 33 The court added, "[w]hether with adequate
Congressional[sic] findings or legislative history, national legislation
of similar scope could be sustained, we leave for another day. Here
we merely hold that Congress has not done what is necessary to locate
section 922(q) within the Commerce Clause." 34
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 35 and, in a 5-4 vote, affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit.36 The majority opinion begins
with "first principles," reviewing Commerce Clause jurisprudence
against the backdrop of the recognition that the Constitution creates a
federal government of enumerated powers. 37 The opinion then fo-

cuses on the class of cases holding that, where the regulated activities
arguably have a substantial relation to interstate commerce, "the
proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'sub'38
stantially affects' interstate commerce.
30. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 46.03(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).
31. United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
32. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing No. 5A-92-CR-841 (W.D. Tex. 1992)).
33. Id.at 1366-68.
34. Id. at 1368.
35. 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
36. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
37. Id.at 1626-30. The import of the Lopez decision likely lies in its curbing federal
Commerce Clause power in general. A discussion of the implications of Lopez as a tool of
curbing Congress in general is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article focuses on the
specific method of reining in Congressional power by requiring empirical data to support
the judgment that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Previously, such determinations were considered to be implicit. For a discussion of some of
these implications, see idat 1657-70 (Souter, J., dissenting).
38. Id.at 1630.
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In applying that test, the Court considered a number of ways in
which Congress might have communicated the nexus showing that the
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. It noted
that a statute could include a "jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
39
question affects interstate commerce."
In effect, the Court reasoned that Congress's legislative authority
is contingent on its ability to factually demonstrate that it is acting
within the prescribed confines of its constitutionally delegated authority. In other words, when legislating pursuant to its power under the
Commerce Clause, Congress must expressly identify empirical data
that demonstrates that the behavior being regulated substantially affects interstate commerce.
In United States v. Edwards, a case whose facts were nearly iden-

tical to that of Lopez, the Ninth Circuit took a different tack.40 The
39. Id. at 1631. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing a jurisdictional element as a way of
providing a reviewing court with empirical data showing the link between the regulated
activity and its substantial affect on interstate commerce).
40. United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291,293 (9th Cir. 1993), vacated and remanded,
115 S.Ct. 1819, rev'd on remand, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 10425 (9th Cir. May 11, 1995). In
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Edwards, the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits, respectively, decided cases arising from challenges to prosecutions under the Gun-Free
School Zones Act. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding the
Act, as applied, to be beyond the reach of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause),
affid, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995); United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993), vacated
and remanded, 115 S.Ct. 1819, rev'd on remand, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 10425 (9th Cir.
May 11, 1995) (holding Act constitutional, because the "possession of firearms adversely
affects the national economy, and consequently, it was reasonable for Congress to regulate
the possession of firearms pursuant to the Commerce Clause").
The cases were, for all practical purposes, factually identical, yet the decisions were
analytically discordant. Lopez and Edwards arose following arrests for violations of 18
U.S.C. § 922(q), prohibiting possession of a firearm in a school zone.
Less than four months after the Fifth Circuit decided Lopez, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of §922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Edwards. In doing
so, it recognized that it was creating a split with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Lopez.
Edwards, 13 F.3d at 294. In Edwards, the Sacramento Police Department gang unit spotted five young men gathered around Ray Edwards' car, which was in the Grant Union
High School parking lot. The police officers and a school security guard thought that Edwards and the others looked like gang members, so they approached them. Id. at 292.
After some discussion, Edwards consented to a search of his car which yielded a .22 rifle
and a sawed-off bolt-action rifle. In exchange for dropping the charge that he violated 26
U.S.C. § 5861(d) (unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun), Edwards entered into a
conditional guilty plea to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), which prohibits possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school. Id. He reserved his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to dismiss the conviction based on a constitutional challenge to 18
U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A). Id. Accordingly, Edwards appealed, arguing that § 922(q)(1)(A)
exceeded Congress's power to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Id.Unpersuaded, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction.
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Ninth Circuit viewed Edwards simply as a challenge to Congress's authority to regulate commerce among the states under the Commerce
Clause. In Edwards, the court found that Congress had acted within
its constitutional powers because the "possession of firearms adversely affects the national economy, and consequently, it was reasonable for Congress to regulate the possession of firearms pursuant to
the Commerce Clause."' 41 It justified this conclusion by pointing to
numerous findings in prior federal gun control laws linking gun possession to interstate commerce-findings the Court in Lopez rejected
as not pertinent to establishing the interstate nexus.42
Although the Lopez case might ultimately be more memorable as
a Tenth Amendment case, it is of interest here because of the ques43
tions it raises regarding the process by which Congress legislates.
Lopez marks a clear departure from the tradition that the judiciary
not mandate the process by which Congress legislates. 4" Indeed the
41. Id. at 293 (citing United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991).
42. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1632 (citing with approval the Fifth Circuit's holding inapposite the expertise garnered by Congress in enacting previous legislation).
43. Some scholars do not conceive of Lopez as presenting a Tenth Amendment case.
See e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formulafor the
Future, 47 VA N. L. REV. 1563, 1582-85 (1994) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit in Lopez
erred in reliance on the Tenth Amendment and that the Supreme Court should correct that
mistake). See generally Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47 VAND. L. REv. 1485
(1994) (discussing the resuscitation of the Tenth Amendment).
44. That deviation from convention is particularly remarkable, when viewed in context of Commerce Clause cases like Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), where the
Supreme Court constructed a factual nexus linking the private use of 239 bushels of wheat
with an impact on interstate commerce based on a detailed set of stipulated facts. Id. at
114. In Wickard, the Supreme Court considered whether the Secretary of Agriculture
could punish a farmer who grew 239 bushels of wheat beyond that which was permitted
under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Id. The farmer claimed to have grown the
239 bushels for use on his farm rather than for sale to the public, but the Act covered any
grain "available for marketing." ikL
at 119. The Court held that in passing the Act, Congress was acting within its powers under the Commerce Clause because even though the
wheat in question was to be used privately, "it supplies a need of the man who grew it
which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat
in this sense competes with wheat in commerce." Id. at 128. Thus, the Court enlarged the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce from acts which taken alone would
affect substantially interstate commerce to those acts whose aggregate or cumulative effects would have a significant national impact.
Understandably, Wickard has been the subject of criticism. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER,
FEDERALisM:

THm FOUNDERS'

DESIGN

148-51 (1987) (arguing that the Court's reversal in

Wickard of earlier decisions limiting congressional power was unjustifiably based on economic developments rather than the Constitution); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: Tm POLITICAL SEDUCrION OF THE LAW

56-57 (1990) (explaining that Wickard,

and cases like it, "abandoned" aspects of the Constitution that defined and limited national
power); RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS

139 (1992) (contending that Wickard was a "manifestly erroneous"
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clear implication from the Lopez case is that for congressional legislation to withstand constitutional challenge it must be supported by empirical data. However, neither the Lopez case, nor subsequent cases
discussing empirical data provide a clear answer to what sort or
amount of empirical data is required.45 Accordingly, this Article considers a variety of methods of meeting an empirical data requirement.
D.

Evaluative Criteria

Simply identifying the empirical data requirement as a deviation
from traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence does not necessarily
advance a discussion or analysis of the appropriateness of the empirical data requirement. The sources of judicial review are "metaconstidecision that left "no conceivable stopping point for the federal commerce power"). See
also Harold J. Krent, Delegation and its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 743 n.138
(1994) (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)) (noting that "the Supreme Court abandoned enforcement of restraints on Congress's Commerce Clause authority after repeatedly confronting the realities of an integrated national
economy [as presented by Wickard and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
41-43 (1937)]").
However, Wickard strikes me as being, technically speaking, perfectly correct. The
price of wheat is a function of supply and demand. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 5274 (11th ed. 1980) (explaining basics of supply and demand). It is highly likely that the
farmer in question would have used some wheat himself, and he would have had to obtain
that wheat somewhere. So, although the overall market might have only been minimally
affected there is an effect which allows Congress to regulate the growing of wheat.
In this case, empirical data can be used to demonstrate the connection between the
purpose of the law-the regulation of interstate commerce-and the means to achieve that
goal-the extension of the regulation of wheat to small, private stashes. However, simply
because the effect on the marketplace is marked does not mean that it is significant. In
such an instance, a requirement that empirical data be used to make that showing only
serves to distinguish between that which is provable and that which is not. An empirical
data requirement, divorced from judgment, offers no guidance in terms of distinguishing
between the significant and the insignificant. Failure to temper hyper-technical requirements with judgment and reason may result in distinctions that are meaningful only as
precedent, but absurd on their own facts.
45. In Florida Bar v. Went For It, No. 94-226, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4250 (June 21, 1995),
the Court divided 5-4 over whether Florida State Bar regulations, which prohibited personal injury lawyers from soliciting victims and their families for 30 days following an accident, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The majority found that the
regulations were supported by the Florida Bar's "106-page summary of its 2-year study of
lawyer advertising and solicitation ... contain[ing] data - both statistical and anecdotal supporting the Bar's contentions" Id. at *16. In dissent, Justice Kennedy, described the
empirical data offered as "noteworthy for its incompetence." Id. at *41. Although the case
was not a review of congressional legislation, the polarization of the Court with respect to
empirical data is nonetheless informative. It appears from the radically different characterizations of the data as though the Court has no unified vision of what kind of facts will
meet its legal standards.
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tutional," 46 so a determination as to the propriety of such a
requirement can only be made by reference to the purpose of the requirement and whether it is both legitimate and accomplishes its goal.
The only legitimate purpose for an empirical data requirement
would be to preserve the constitutional balance between the legislature and the judiciary. As has already been established, there is no
clear directive as to how to accomplish that goal. Given that uncertainty, this Article puts forward a series of guidelines for evaluating
how and under what circumstances an empirical data requirement
might be appropriate.
Because the requirement that legislation be supported by empirical data is as unformed as it is, there are a variety of ways in which
empirical data could be presented to the courts. The following are
criteria this Article uses to evaluate the utility of each method of ineluding facts. The criteria focus on the Congress and the Judiciary,
and what best suits each branch. They also take into account the people of the United States, for the effect of government on the governed
is critical to a healthy democracy. These criteria are not designed to
ascertain whether, as a legal matter, a certain empirical data requirement will offend the Constitution. 47 Rather, they are written with an
awareness that, within some as-yet-undefined limits, an empirical data
requirement is unavoidable. And so, these criteria are offered to help
craft a requirement, or set of requirements, that will best serve certain
goals. The goals for each branch are to maintain as much autonomy
as possible without running roughshod over the other branch.
Autonomy is the starting point for Congress as well as the judiciary, for it is in the claim to self-regulation that each justifies its authority to regulate legislation. Some measure of control over the process
by which facts supporting legislation are found may be contained in
that authority.
For Congress, there are two conflicting ways in which that autonomy might be preserved. The first would be that courts reviewing legislation require clear statements of fact finding from the Congress.
"Tough love" is the rationale for such a rule: Either the legislature
crafts its statutes carefully by clearly indicating their factual bases, or
the statutes go unenforced. Presumably, pressure would mount on the
legislature to better craft its legislation. Legislative autonomy, in this
sense, would be secured by enforcing a set of rules that force the legis46. See supra note 17.
47. As stated earlier, there is not one source of law that will definitively resolve that

question. See supra note 18.
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lature to legislate independently, without reliance on the judiciary to
clarify or complete the fact finding process.
Alternatively, legislative autonomy is best furthered when the
desires of the legislature are best protected. Rather than requiring
and motivating independent action on the part of the legislature, as
described above, the judiciary could scour the legislative record for
shards of facts from which a rational basis might be built. The goal is
for the judiciary to come as close as possible to enforcing whatever it
48
believes the legislature was seeking to effect.

These two approaches to protecting congressional autonomy
sometimes clash. However, the context in which the empirical data
requirement arises often dictates which method of preserving congressional autonomy is feasible. Some problems cannot be addressed by
any precautions: For instance, those arising when legislation is rendered irrational because of facts that have changed. In such a setting
"tough love" accomplishes nothing. 4 9 Similarly, sometimes so little in48. An analogy can be drawn to different approaches to contract formation taken by
the common law and the Uniform Commercial Code. The common law is far stricter in
requiring parties to clearly state the terms of their contract, or else it will fail for indefiniteness. In contrast, the Uniform Commercial Code's Article 2 provides contracting parties
with a variety of gap-filling sections that will guide the court in determining, after the fact,
what the obligations of the parties are. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(3) official comments, § 2305 & cmt. 1. Where the common law looks to the parties themselves to create fully
fleshed out contracts, the U.C.C. looks to see whether the parties intended to be bound,
and having determined that, will then construct, with the guidance of its gap-filling termsmany of which look to industry standards-the individual obligations of the parties. Obviously something is gained and lost by each method of regulating contract formation. The
common law suffers from excess rigidity, which will sometimes leave parties who intended
to make a contract, without one. Informed parties can combat such defeats by including all
relevant terms. The U.C.C.'s method of patrolling contract formation carries with it the
potential of assigning to a party an obligation which that party did not, at the time of
contracting, assume. Again, an informed party can combat such intrusions by the judiciary
by making each term explicit, thus displacing the gap fillers. In both instances, the key to
avoiding judicial intrusion lies in a fully-fleshed out contract.
49. Dean Scott H. Bice provides a useful example:
[A] court today may be faced with the task of assessing legislation that was passed
in 1920 banning a certain food additive to prevent disease. The court might ask
whether it was plausible in 1920 to believe that there was a link between the food
additive and the disease, or the court might consider the limits of empirical
knowledge at the time of enforcement. Suppose that the judge is presented with
conclusive evidence based on research conducted in 1970, showing that no link
exists between the additive and the disease.
Scott H. Bice, RationalityAnalysis in ConstitutionalLaw, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1980).
Absent another compelling rationale for such legislation, such a law could not survive rationality review. Congress in 1920 could not have foreseen such a circumstance. Nor is
"the legislature ... under a constitutional obligation to monitor legislation for factual obsolescence." Id. at 34-35 n.101.
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formation about the facts known to Congress is available that it is
difficult to effect Congress's will. Accurate identification of such a
predicament can be difficult. For instance, some judges are less willing and able to effect Congress's will than are others. Such judicial
apathy may blind a court to seeing the facts necessary to construct the
requisite support for the challenged legislation. 50
For the judiciary, favored fact finding methods are those which
protect judicial autonomy, provide judges with the least opportunity
to exhibit personal preferences, and permit it to conduct constitutional review in the most efficient possible fashion. Like legislative
autonomy, judicial autonomy is susceptible to several definitions. To
begin with, an autonomous judiciary must maintain its power to declare irrational statutes unconstitutional. Therefore, although courts
must defer to legislative judgments, as well as to the process by which
the facts that inform those judgments are gathered, that deference
cannot be absolute. If judicial review is to have any meaning, the judiciary must be able to react when a piece of legislation is based on "an
obvious mistake. '51 The better the judiciary informs itself as to relevant facts-be it through briefing from counsel, review of legislative
histories, or independent research 52-the more easily the judiciary can
identify those "obvious mistakes."
Distinctions between scientific and political facts become increasingly important in this regard. The judiciary is less well suited to override a political fact with which it disagrees than it is a scientific one.
Because scientific facts are right or wrong in some sense, correcting
them does not require the same exertion of personal preferences.
50. See infra Part III.B(4) for a discussion of the implications of such cases.
51. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547 (1924). See infra Part III.D for a
discussion of judicial review of legislative errors.
52. For a stellar example of a Justice on a fact-finding mission, see Justice Breyer's
dissent in United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1657-70 (1995). Different methods of
fact finding have been employed by members of the judiciary. Consider Judge Jerome
Frank's foray into independent fact finding in the Triangle PublicationsIna v. Rohrlich
case:
[A]s neither the trial judge nor any member of this court is (or resembles) a teenage girl or the mother or sister of such a girl, our judicial notice apparatus will not
work well unless we feed it with information directly obtained from 'teen-agers'
or from their female relatives accustomed to shop for them. Competently to inform ourselves, we should have a staff of investigators like those supplied to administrative agencies. As we have no such staff, I have questioned some
adolescent girls and their mothers and sisters, persons I have chosen at random. I
have been told uniformly by my questionees that no one could reasonably believe
that any relation existed between plaintiff's magazine and defendants' girdles.
167 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting).
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Where the judiciary is reviewing legislation that rests upon a basis that
is not accurate, as a scientific matter, an active judiciary may find itself
devoting a great deal of time to information gathering to determine
whether the fact is correct or not. Where the fact at issue is political,
it might still be right or wrong-either as a matter of opinion or as an
accurate or inaccurate reading of political desires. Yet, concerns over
judicial legislation are implicated more where political facts are reviewed than where scientific facts are at issue. Political decisionmaking is the essence of the legislative function. Ascertaining the
scientific facts upon which political facts rest is a subset of political
fact finding. It is a critical component and any review of scientific
facts may threaten the integrity of a political fact, but it is the legislative judgment drawn from the facts that is at the core of the legislative
function.
A "tough love" approach to legislation that strikes down those
laws for which there is an insufficient factual basis best protects the
judiciary from spending time and resources trying to create that basis.
However, it is not clear that a "tough love" approach to judicial review will assist in curbing judicial preferences. The decision to find
the factual basis of a piece of legislation lacking is one that may be
53
politically charged.
Finally, the public is best served by rules governing the requirement that facts be found a certain way when those rules are set forth
in the least duplicitous fashion and lead to fact-finding methods that
are open and reviewable by the public. The public is able to best protect its preferences and monitor the work of the legislature and the
judiciary when those branches are straightforward in their actions.
The public's ability to make decisions in a well-informed and rational
fashion depends on its understanding of facts underlying legislation.
This is true regardless of whether the facts are scientific or political.
Examination of the methods of gathering empirical data is only
feasible if one is informed about what sort of data is classified as
"fact" by Congress, how those "facts" are found and what Congress
does with them once they are found. Accordingly, the next section
briefly outlines some of the practices and procedures governing congressional fact finding.

53. See supra notes 8, 11 and accompanying text (discussing the political nature of the
empirical data cases).
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U. Congressional Fact Finding
Congress has a profound need for facts. 54 The bulk of its workthe determination of whether a problem needs a legislative solution
and whether a given solution will solve that problem-is entirely de55
pendent on facts of one sort or another.
A. Political vs. Scientific Facts
There are essentially two kinds of facts with which Congress is
concerned: political facts and scientific facts.5 6 Returning to the Lopez case, an example of a political fact is that the public wants guns
kept away from school yards. An example of a scientific fact is the
extent to which the presence of guns within 1000 feet of a school yard
has a quantifiably significant impact on interstate commerce. As a
general matter, political facts tend to assist in the determination of
whether a problem needs a legislative solution, and scientific facts
help determine whether a particular solution actually alleviates the
problem. But Congress draws no bright line between the use of these
two kinds of facts, nor for that matter, does such a line neccesarily
57
separate them.
Although Congress may base its lawmaking decisions on no facts,
political facts, scientific facts or a hybrid, analysis of the empirical data
requirement makes a distinction between the two critical.58 At least
in theory, scientific facts are objective in nature. In contrast, political
54. See THm HousE AT WoRK 239-46 (Joseph Cooper & G. Calvin Mackenzie eds.,
1981) (describing the distinctive and demanding informational needs of the House); Kenneth Janda, Information Systems for Congress,in TwELVE STUDIES OF THE ORGANIZATION
OF CONGRESS

415 (1966).

55. Louis Sandy Maisel, Congressional Information Sources, in TmE HousE AT
WORK, supra note 54, at 266-67 (arguing that, as public opinion moves toward demanding
a smaller, more efficient government, Congress will be forced to evaluate and choose
among ongoing programs, excising those which are not meeting expectations).
56. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (defining political as distinguished
from scientific facts). See generally CHARLEs TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND

A REFERENCE, RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 149-63 (1989) (discussing purposes of hearings and motivations of members' actions in preparation for and in
response to hearings).
57. One commentator has broken down the information needs of members of Congress into four categories: "procedural or operational information," concerning that which
is happening on the floor; "program information," which is akin to the scientific facts identified above; "political decision-making information," a hybrid category having to do with
the political facts as well as the effect a national plan might have on a member's district;
and finally, "ongoing evaluative information," which is a running tab on how programs are
operating. Maisel, supra note 55, at 249-51.
58. Of course, Congress is not compelled to rely on any facts at all-political or scientific. However, as a practical matter, it is unlikely that Congress would pass laws randomly,
PROCEDURE:
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facts are barometric readings of the desires of the populace. Political
and scientific facts may be used interchangeably. In such a case, there
may be the pretense that the "best solution" is chosen based on objective criteria even when legislative action is motivated entirely by political facts. 59 Some sort of political fact finding will inevitably go into
any decisionmaking by a legislature. However, that is not necessarily
the case with scientific fact finding. It is possible to enact a piece of
legislation without reference to or reliance upon scientific facts. Such
a law might be rooted in urban myth or popular desires. 60 Where such
a law contravenes scientific facts, problems may arise. For example,
such a law may appear to be irrational, as it is not rooted in scientific
fact. Alternatively, there may be no scientifically factual basis for a
law passed as an experimental measure. Some political problems arise
at a time when there is no clear, scientific fact-based solution, and so
61
the legislature might be legislating in the face of uncertainty.
Regardless of which sort of fact is at issue, Congress has no formal or legal obligation to engage in any fact finding prior to the pasas there is no benefit and various controls tend to minimize this. See infra text accompanying notes 62-63.
There are some who do believe that political facts ought to play a minimal role in
legislation. See, e.g., Francois Geny, Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Necessity and
Method, in THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 7 (Ernest Bruncken & Layton B. Register
trans., 1969) ("Even in the legislative sphere it seems to me very doubtful whether those
intrusted with the duty of establishing general legal rules ought to be guided principally by
public opinion, which is always unstable and very little sure of itself.").
59. See Allen Schick, Informed Legislation: Policy Research Versus Ordinary Knowledge, in KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND THE CONGRESS 99, 100-02, 108-15 (William H. Robinson & Clay H. Wellborn eds., 1991) (examining the interaction of ordinary knowledge (or
scientific facts) and policy research (or political facts) in certain legislative actions in the
1980's).
60. Challenges have been brought to laws criminalizing marijuana and cocaine on the
basis that there is no scientific basis for placing these drugs in the same class with heroin
and opiates. See e.g., United States v. Ward, 387 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Castro, 401 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ill. 1975). For an excellent discussion of the difficulty in
bringing such challenges, and of the government's control over empirical data, see Richard
Delgado, Active Rationality in Judicial Review, 64 MINN. L. REV. 467 (1980).
61. For an example, drawn from outside the constitutional context, consider the debate over the amount of funding to be allocated for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI):
Mr. Kyl: A lot of my colleagues have just said that they are just not sure whether
[SDI] will work. Mr. Chairman, the point here is to provide a funding level sufficient to find out the answer to that question. . . . [T]he Boxer-Dellums amendment will not even begin to get close to providing those funds necessary to
conduct the tests to find out whether SDI will work so that we can make an
informed judgment.
135 CONG. REC. H4207-08 (daily ed. July 25, 1989), reprinted in, KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 63 (1991).

August 1995]

THE POLITICS OF FACTS

sage of legislation.62 Nevertheless, a variety of informal political
obligations compel it to do so. These range from the self-interested
desire for re-election to the civic-minded concern for serving one's
constituents by ascertaining their needs and how best to serve them,
to the need to use facts to persuade other lawmakers. All of these
forces share a common root: the relatively noncontroversial recognition that rational policy decisions are best made based on scientific
facts. 63
B. Formal and Informal Fact Finding

Fact finding by Congress can be broken into two rough categories: formal and informal. Formal fact finding is that which leaves a
legislative record. It is largely carried on through the hearings process
but also includes, for example, the commissioning of a study by the
Congressional Research Service. Informal fact finding is not part of
the congressional record, and may not leave any record at all, but it
can, in some cases, be more persuasive or informative than its formal
counterpart. Its sources consist of general education, knowledge gathered by talking to other members (typically those of a similar philosophical bent), lobbyists, staff, friends and constituents, by making
fact-finding junkets, by reviewing past legislation or even by reading a
novel or watching television. 64 Although informal fact finding may
range across many varied sources, it is not systemically less authoritative or less rooted in scientific fact than is formal fact finding. To the
contrary, lobbyists increasingly support their persuasive efforts with
data. 65
Formal fact finding is largely conducted through congressional
hearings. Hearings serve a critical legitimating function. They assure
62. Nor does Congress have a formal obligation to "articulate its reasons for passing a
staute." FCC v. Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (1993). See also Hans A.
Linde, Due Processof Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. Rnv. 197, 226 (1976) (discussing the nexus
between legislative means and ends).
63. See Julius Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886, 892-97
(1950) [hereinafter Julius Cohen, Towards Realism]. "Realism in jurisprudence calls for a
working arrangement between science and judicial law. Realism in legisprudence calls for a
similar arrangement with legislative law. Both are but facets of a single purpose-the illumination of the pathways of policy-making with the best light that human knowledge and
experience can possibly provide." 1d. at 897. See also Delgado, supra note 60, at 519-20.
64. See KREHBIEL, supra note 61, at 76-103 (discussing how members seek out
information).
65. See, e.g., Carol H. Weiss, Comment, Policy Research Versus OrdinaryKnowledge,
in KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND THE CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 120 (committee hearings
are "implicit in due process if lawmakers are really bound to a rule that laws must be made
as rational means toward some agreed purpose").
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interested parties that Congress has based its legislation on certain
facts. 66 Often a hearing will unite, in one room, those interested parties who wish to bring relevant facts to the attention of the legislature.
At least arguably, a hearing is an opportunity for all those concerned
about a particular problem to gather together and consider different
options. 67 It also allows for the creation of a formal record, an opportunity to inform and persuade legislators and the public as well as to
68
create (or dash) political desire for a given legislative solution.
Hearings might also be the single richest source of information about
what the legislators were thinking about in considering a piece of
legislation.
However, a hearing is not a town meeting. To the contrary, a
hearing is an elaborate and somewhat bizarre re-creation of informal
70
fact finding. 69 It is a carefully organized, choreographed event:
In planning the presentation of testimony, the author will sit down
in advance of the hearings with his friends and allies among the organized groups which have persuaded him to sponsor the bill. In a
series of conferences they will select the best witnesses they can find
and will brief them in advance of the hearings on their testimony
and on the attitudes of the committeemen. They will utilize all the
66. Linde, supra note 62, at 223-24. See also GEORGE B. GALLOWAY, HISTORY OF
195-203 (Stanley Wise ed., 2d ed. 1976) (describing the

Tm HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

translation of a legislative proposal into law).
The fixed nature of lawmaking helps to provide access to those who wish to be heard
by a deliberating legislature. Bills become law in a methodical fashion: in the first house a
bill is introduced, referred to a committee, then reported out of that committee to the
floor. Committee work and floor consideration is repeated in the second chamber which is
then followed by a conference committee which includes members of each house. TIEFER,
supra note 56, at 32-33.
67. A hearing provides legislators with an opportunity to ascertain what power
groups support or oppose certain legislative proposals ... it serves as an instrument for calculating the political advantages and disadvantages of casting a 'yea'
or 'nay' vote if and when the measure reaches the floor.... The hearing might...
be used as a method by which those already committed to a legislative policy give
that policy an aura of well-reasoned respectability by making it appear that the
decision was arrived at on rational grounds.... Those who control the committee
machinery may also use the hearings as a device to suppress facts salient to a
policy issue because of the fear that an exposure of the facts might lend support to
a policy which they do not wish to be enacted into law.
Julius Cohen, Towards Realism, supra note 63, at 892.
68. GALLOWAY, supra note 66, at 203 ("[T]he hearings may take on the atmosphere
of an economic seminar.").
69. See Julius Cohen, Hearing on a Bilk Legislative Folklore?, 37 MINN. L. REv. 34
(1952) [hereinafter Julius Cohen, Legislative Folklore].
70. THOMAS B. CURTIS & DONALD L. WESTERFIELD, CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 12-13
(1992) (describing strategic control over hearings in order to manipulate news coverage of
hearings) (citations omitted).
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techniques of modem research to fortify their case with elaborate
71
charts, tables, and statistics.
But just because a hearing might properly be described as a legal
fiction does not mean that it serves no substantive purpose. Sometimes a hearing does exactly what it sounds as though it ought to do:
educate legislators as to the nature of the problem at hand. Often the
staff set up the hearings, select the witnesses and draft the questions.
Accordingly, the members may not know much about an issue when
they come to the hearing. A hearing also can be extremely worthwhile in turning up political facts. 72 That is, it can serve as an invaluable barometer of the intensity of interest in a given problem or
legislative solution. 73
Like many legal fictions, there is an essential truth underlying the
fiction of a congressional hearing as a source of facts. Here the fiction
is that the lawmakers are holding hearings to become informed about
a given matter. Clearly they are already informed, for how else could
they have selected the witnesses for what they will say? The reality is
that the legislature has gathered facts, but this process occurred prior
to the hearings, on an informal basis.74
Formal fact finding serves three other important functions. As it
leaves a record, 75
it assists in accountability. One of the reasons that
"self-regulation" of Congress has any measure of success, is that representatives are accountable to the voters. Voters tend to prefer those

71. GALLOWAY, supra note 66, at 203. See TIEFER, supra note 56, at 157-58.
72. Legislators are not the only ones educated by hearings. By conducting open hearings, or hearings in the field, as it often does, the legislature is able to educate the public
about problems sought to be eliminated through proposed legislation, as well as about
possible solutions.
73. Granted, it can also generate that interest.
74. See generally LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FicnONS (1967) (discussing legal fictions
extensively).
75. Certain features that tend to motivate Congress to self-regulate, such as the taking
of an oath to uphold the constitution, the deliberative nature of the legislative process or
the accountability of representatives to voters, have the effect of channeling legislation
within constitutionally-proscribed limits, but do not serve as an infallible prophylactic
against congressional excess. In the vast majority of instances, Congress acts within its
provinces. Nevertheless, self-regulation only achieves so much. Congress is not in total
control of whether its acts are constitutional, for it is the judiciary that decides when Congress has overstepped its authority under the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803). Some say that the judiciary took that authority earlier in Hayburn's
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). Mark E. Herrmann, Note, Looking Down from the Hil"
FactorsDeterminingthe Sucess of CongressionalEfforts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpretations of the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543, 546 n.24 (1992).
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who represent their interests or who act rationally. 76 Another function served by formal fact finding, tied to its educative function, is its
ability to improve representation. The way we learn about others is
by gathering information about them and their concerns. 7" Finally,
when legislation is reviewed by the judiciary, the most significant benefit of formal fact finding lies in the apparently greater amount of information provided about the enacting Congress. Quite simply, where
there has been formal fact finding, a reviewing court has something
78
beyond the challenged legislation to review.
III.

Empirical Data Linking Legislation's Ends and Means

This section catalogs the ways in which the empirical data requirement might be met. As the empirical data requirement is not a
requirement that has been clearly set forth by the courts, this section
considers six different ways that empirical data supporting legislation
might be presented to the courts. It also evaluates each method of
putting forward empirical data in light of the criteria set forth in Section I.
A.

Overview

There are six categories of sources of empirical data. First, Congress can make the restricted behavior a jurisdictional element of the
legislation. In other words, it can make a factual finding that performance of the acts sought to be regulated triggers Congress's constitutional authority to regulate the act. For example, Congress might
make it unlawful to possess a gun in or affecting commerce. In such a
case, successful prosecution or enforcement under the legislation
hinges on proof of the nexus.
Second, Congress can make specific factual findings as to how the
restricted behavior affects that which empowers Congress to legislate
76. A rational legislator is one whose legislative acts are justifiable, either because of
political facts or scientific ones. See Abner J. Mikva, Foreword: Symposium on the Theory
of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 174-75 (1988) [hereinafter Mikva, Foreword]. There
are those who argue that a rational legislator is one who pursues self-interest. See Geoffrey
Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral?: The Casefor the "Nobel" Lie,
74 VA. L. REV. 179, 181 (1988). In this instance, the relevant self-interest of the legislator
is to please constituents so that she may be re-elected.
77. Informal fact finding also assists in the representative function of lawmaking. A
legislator who has a talk with a constituent about a certain topic may be learning just as
much about her constituents as a legislator who gathers facts formally.
78. The extent to which a reviewing court will find formal fact finding reliable depends on the court as well as where in the legislative history the formal fact finding rests.
See discussion infra Parts III.B(3)-(4).

August 1995]-

THE POLITCS OF FACrS

in the area. Such factual findings would be included in the legislation
itself or its legislative history. For instance, Congress might make a
finding as to how the possession of guns within 1000 feet of a school
affects commerce.
Third, general knowledge gained from previous legislative experiences may be a source of facts. Facts so found might be located in
prior legislation or the legislative histories of prior laws. For example,
in the course of enacting legislation on gun control, legislators may
have learned about the effect of guns on commerce. That knowledge
may be detailed in the prior legislation or its legislative histories.
Fourth, legislation enacted after the passage of the challenged law
can provide facts with which to construct a nexus. Indeed, when it
enacted the Omnibus Crime Bill in 1993, Congress amended the GunFree School Zones Act of 1990 to include facts attempting to establish
the connection between interstate commerce and the prohibition
against the possession of guns within 1000 feet of a school zone.79
Fifth, counsel arguing a case may present relevant facts to the
court during litigation of that case.
And sixth, the court itself might independently identify facts necessary to construct the elusive nexus. Such facts might be drawn from
legislation other than that at issue as well as other sources. Indeed,
Justice Breyer's dissent in Lopez includes an Appendix of sources of
data that he believes establish the nexus between guns in school zones
and, through their effect on education, the threat they pose to interstate and foreign commerce.80
The following sections will analyze how each of these methods of
fact finding can operate to meet the empirical data requirement, given
the nature and goals of Congress, the judiciary and the public.8 '
B. Facts and an Act
(1) Facts Are the Act

In theory, the least problematic way to meet an empirical data
requirement is to incorporate the facts that demonstrate the endsmeans nexus of a piece of legislation as a jurisdictional element of the
regulated behavior. For example, rather than prohibiting "possess[ion
of] a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
79. S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). See
infra note 142 and accompanying text for the text of the amendment and an analysis of it.
80. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1665-71 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. The method by which courts interpret legislation has become "an integral part of
the legislative process." Katzmann, supra note 23, at 667.
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cause to believe, is a school zone" as does §922(q) of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, the statute might make unlawful "possess[ion of a firearm] in or affecting commerce" or more particularly,
"possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school where such possession affects commerce. '82 Where the factual findings define the restricted behavior there is a complete overlap between the regulated
behavior and the legitimacy of the end sought to be achieved by the
regulation. 83 In such a situation each goal has been met, nearly automatically. The only constitutional issue with respect to such a piece of
legislation is whether it is constitutional for reasons other than its factual basis, an issue beyond the scope of this Article. The only factual
questions remaining are those that may be resolved on a case-by-case
basis; such fact finding is of the sort in which courts regularly engage.
Including the factual nexus as a jurisdictional element of the legislation preserves Congressional and judicial autonomy. Congressional autonomy is served by the explicit inclusion of facts attempting
to show that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. By its terms, such legislation only goes so far as Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause will go. Decisions regarding the
extent of such power are decided by the courts on an individual basis. 84 It could be argued that this division of authority-Congress enacts legislation, the contours of which are decided on fact-specific
individual bases-is one which preserves to each branch a measure of
85
autonomy.
The inclusion of facts as a jurisdictional element could be said to
beg the question: whether the courts may require of Congress a factual basis for its legislation. By incorporating a jurisdictional element
into its legislation, some strife between the branches is avoided. In
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. V 1993). Unlike § 922(q), § 922(g) is so drafted.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit in Lopez observed that "[blecause a commerce nexus is an
element of the crime defined by section 922(g), each application of that statute is within
the commerce power." United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (5th Cir. 1993), affd,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
83. The Fifth Circuit noted that "despite the absence of 'formal findings,' the [Katzenbach v. McClung] Court relied on the wording of the statute itself, which amounted to an
express finding of the requisite effect on commerce under certainfacts, and on the legislative
history showing the extensive evidence before Congress implicating interstate commerce."
Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362 (emphasis added) (discussing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964)).
84. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
85. However, this type of legislating may merely shift the forum of contention to administrative rule-making and litigation. A law banning possession of a firearm affecting
commerce is exceedingly vague-perhaps unconstitutionally so. It is not clear that this is a
better posture for courts to address the Commerce Clause issue.
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such instances the legislature is willingly giving to the judiciary the
authority to decide, on a case-by-case basis, the limits of its Commerce
Clause authority. Because the legislature seems to be giving up its
authority freely, there is no loss of autonomy suffered by the
legislature.
In sum, the inclusion of a jurisdictional element effectively sidesteps the issue. It is quite clear from Lopez that the Court is not requiring that Commerce Clause legislation include a jurisdictional element, so the day when Congress is no longer willingly ceding to the
judiciary the authority to render case-by-case decisions in this area has
not yet arrived. However, it also appears from the Lopez case that
the Court may be requiring much more of the sort of evidence typically used to demonstrate a case-specific showing that the regulated
behavior substantially affects interstate commerce. The Court appears to be looking for express factual findings demonstrating that
link.
(2) Facts In the Act
There is no legal requirement that legislation include formal factual findings demonstrating that interstate commerce will be substantially affected by the regulated activity. However, when it fails to do
so, Congress passes up an opportunity to inform the reviewing court
about the facts that show how the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. In Lopez, the majority expresses great
concern that Congressional Commerce Clause power not be converted into general police power.8 6 Accordingly, the majority declines
to "pile inference upon inference" to show that possession of a gun is
an economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.8 7
As a practical matter, where the legislature has been specific about
the actual factual basis of the legislation, it is less at the mercy of the
ingenuity of a reviewing court that may or may not identify its own
factual basis. 88 This eliminates some of the fortuity that depends on
86. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
87. Id
88. See supra note 40 (comparing the Lopez and Edwards cases). For another example of a reviewing court constructing a basis for legislation, see National Paint & Coatings
Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1995). In that case, Judge Easterbrook
discusses the rationality of municipal legislation under which graffiti-addicted teens could
be affected by the elasticity in price of spray paint. Id. at 1127-28. Of course, with his
background in law and economics, Judge Easterbrook may be better suited to construct a
rationale for such legislation than most.
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the identity of the judges on the reviewing court. 89 In addition, inclu-

sion of factual findings provides a legislature some measure of control
over the extent to which a reviewing court can construct its own factual basis for the legislation. 90 As a corollary to that, reliance by
courts on findings of fact culled from non-congressional sources to ascertain the facts showing, for example, the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce leaves the legislature without an
impetus to craft its legislation more carefully. When the empirical
data are included in the legislation, the court's role is, in essence, narrowed to reviewing the data to assess whether they are correct. 91
When the court's role is so contained, it is prevented from considering
arguably illegitimate concerns, such as political preferences. 92 Accordingly, the goal of judicial autonomy is furthered.

All of these benefits assume that the factual findings included in
the statute are sound. Such an assumption may not be warranted.
Facts included in the findings section of legislation are often con89. It is axiomatic that the identity of the judge may influence the extent to which a
law is reviewed. See Max Radin, The Theory of JudicialDecision: Or How Judges Think
(1925), in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 195 (William W. Fisher, III et al. eds., 1993).
90. The scope of that delegation of authority remains a highly debated issue. That is,
to what extent is the reviewing court free to construct meaning from the legislative history?
Cf. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1359-60; Edwards, 13 F.3d at 292-94 (using legislative history to
demonstrate nexus).
See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Pleafor Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 995,
1014 (1987) (recommending that Congress elevate the Office of the Law Revision Counsel
to a prominent position where it could "hear judicial pleas for a clear statement" of what
Congress intended by ambiguous legislation).
91. A distinction must be noted between those situations where Congress has included facts in its legislation that show a particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce and those situations where such a factual finding has not been included. If Congress's findings are correct, then it is difficult to claim its legislative judgment is outside the
realm of reason. This is not to say that the judiciary is required to include such findings or
that the appropriate "test" for reviewing Commerce Clause legislation is whether Congress
was correct in reaching a finding. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1656 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Regardless, "passing" the empirical data requirement does not completely insulate the
legislation from review. Assuming that the data are considered to be sound, their inclusion
in the legislation has the effect of flattening certain differences among courts. Currently,
the standard of review allows either the judiciary or the legislature to devise the rational
basis upon which the nexus is built. The Supreme Court itself has constructed rational
bases for the legislature. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S.
483, 487 (1955). Thus, a silent legislature is at the mercy of the ingenuity of the reviewing
court in devising a rational basis for the "finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce." Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981).
92. But see Julius Cohen, The Labor-Welfare Cases: A Socio-Legal Approach, 10 U.
CH. L. REV. 375, 416 (1943) [hereinafter Julius Cohen, Labor-Welfare Cases] (concluding
that facts are only persuasive to the extent that they support value preferences of courts).
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clusory or it is unclear what kind of fact is being relied upon. 93 Consider the factual findings that form the basis of the Policy Concerning
Homosexuality in the Armed Forces:
(13) The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding element of military law that continues to be necessary in
the unique circumstances of military service.
(14) The armed forces must maintain personnel policies that
exclude persons whose presence in the armed forces would create
an unacceptable risk to the armed forces' high standards of morale,
good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of

military capability.

(15) The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would
create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good
order and discipline,
and unit cohesion that are the essence of mili94
tary capability.
93. See infra note 142 (discussing factual findings amending the Gun-Free School
Zones Act). While some of the findings appear to be based on empirical data ("(C) firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and have been found in increasing numbers in and around schools, as documented in numerous hearings in both the
Judiciary committee of the House of Representatives and Judiciary Committee of the Senate"), some are meaningless assertions ("(E) while criminals freely move from state to
state, ordinary citizens and foreign visitors may fear to travel to or through certain parts of
the country due to concern about violent crime and gun violence, and parents may decline
to send their children to school for the same reason"). That some citizens, visitors or parents "may" be affected by gun violence is meaningless as a factual finding.
94. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (Supp. V 1993) (describing the policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces). There is virtually nothing in the legislative record to substantiate the scientific facts, or the scientific factual basis of the political facts. These findings of
fact were culled largely from anecdotal testimony presented by, among others, General
Colin Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf. Generalizing from anecdotes is precarious science. Consider General Schwarzkopf's testimony:
[I]n my years of military service, I have experienced the fact that the introduction
of an open homosexual into a small unit immediately polarizes that unit and destroys the very bonding that is so important for the unit's survival in time of
war... [I]n every case I am familiar with, and there are many, whenever it became known in a unit that someone was openly homosexual, polarization occurred, violence sometimes followed, morale broke down, and unit effectiveness
suffered.
S. Rap. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 280 (1993).
General Schwarzkopf's testimony is factual in the sense that it is a series of anecdotes
reporting his observations of the effect on military units of open homosexuals. Whether
the career-long observations of a General can be reasonably expanded into a military policy is a matter of political judgment as well as scientific fact. It is testable as a scientific fact
by gathering more empirical evidence on the subject.
General Powell's testimony was similarly anecdotal and rooted in his personal values:
Unlike race or gender, sexuality is not a benign trait. It is manifested by behavior. While it would be decidedly biased to assume certain behaviors based on
gender or membership in a particular racial group, the same is not true for sexuality. We have successfully mixed rich and poor, black and white, male and female,
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Such issues more commonly arise where facts are debatable.
Here, there is virtually nothing in the legislative record that substantiates these findings of fact.
Paragraph (13) of the Findings of Fact is more properly characterized as a combination of a scientific fact and a political fact. The scientific fact is that military law has long prohibited homosexual
conduct. The political fact is that the prohibition continues to be
necessary.
Paragraph (14) is, largely a conclusion, but it also includes a scientific fact, albeit one that may be incorrect. The conclusion is that
the armed forces "must" maintain certain kinds of personnel policies.
It is difficult to know whether that conclusion is reasonable without a
further understanding of that which has driven it. The scientific fact
included in this paragraph is that the essence of military capability is
the armed forces' high standards of morale, good order and discipline,
and unit cohesion. In Able v. United States,95 Judge Nickerson found
otherwise.
Paragraph (15) appears to marry (incorrect) scientific fact with
(unreasonably arrived at) political fact. The scientific fact would be
that there is a link between the presence of people who demonstrate a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts with the creation of
a risk to military capability (as defined in paragraph (14). The political fact is that the level of that risk would be "unacceptable".
The inclusion of useless assertions or conclusory statements in
legislation would not taint the legislation; at the minimum scrutiny
level of the Commerce Clause or the rational basis test employed in
equal protection jurisprudence 96 it is nearly impossible to taint legislabut open homosexuality in units is not just the acceptance of benign characteristics such as color or gender or background. It involves matters of privacy and
human sexuality that, in our judgment, if allowed to exist openly in the military,
would affect the cohesion and well-being of the force. It asks us to deal with
fundamental issues that the society at large has not yet been able to deal with.
S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 281 (1993).
95. 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
96. If an equal protection challenge were brought to the statute in which these findings of fact are located-Section 571 of the National Defense Authorization Act for the
Fiscal Year 1994-the appropriate standard of review would likely be rational basis.
Walmer v. United States, 52 F.3d 851 (10th Cir. 1995), ducked determination of the applicable standard of review. It upheld the district court's ruling that "whether we should apply
the active rational basis test or the traditional rational basis test need not be decided.
Under either test, plaintiff cannot prevail because of Tenth Circuit precedent." Id. at 85455. The Tenth Circuit precedent, Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir.
1984), rejected the argument that homosexuality constitutes a suspect class. In Rich, the
Tenth Circuit applied the rational basis test to a challenge to the military's old policy
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tion. 97 However, a tautology does not provide a rational basis for legislation. In such a case, the deference due Congress in order to
preserve congressional autonomy is diminished. 98 And the court is
left to its own devices to ascertain a factual basis for the legislation.
Assuming that the conclusory nature of such findings is brought
to the court's attention, such factual findings should provide little guidance to a reviewing court. The end result is that such factual findings
strain the judiciary while offering little protection of legislative autonomy. The judiciary is stressed because distinguishing between political and scientific facts is exceedingly difficult. It is through such strife
that Constitutional rights are protected and limits on Constitutional
power is observed.
(3) Facts in Legislative History

A legislative history is a collection of Congress's formal findings
of fact. Formal fact finding can come from hearings or factual investiagainst homosexuality in the armed forces. However, it went beyond a rational basis review by holding that "even if heightened scrutiny were required in reviewing the Army
Regulations because they restrict a fundamental right, the classification is valid in light of
the Army's demonstration of a compelling governmental interest in maintaining the discipline and morale of the armed forces." Id. at 1229.
The resolution of the applicable standard of review may have to do with whether the
plaintiff challenges the speech element of the regulations. In Philips v. Perry, 883 F. Supp.
539 (W.D. Wash. 1995), the court applied the rational basis test to an equal protection
challenge to the regulations brought by a plaintiff who had engaged in homosexual acts. In
Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), where a group of plaintiffs challenged the military's new policy, the court held that "[b]ecause the Act gives to persons of
one status, heterosexual, the chance to exercise the fundamental right of free speech and
prohibits it to those of another status, homosexual, defendants must at least show that the
policy is 'tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest."' Id. at 980.
It is not yet clear what standard of review will be applied to this policy. However, the
military's old policy concerning homosexuals was subject to rational basis review. See Steffan v. Secretary of Defense, 41 F.3d 677,688-89 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Meinhold v.
Secretary of the Navy, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir. 1994); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d
454,464 (7th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871
F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Dronenburg v. Zech,

741 F.2d 1388, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
97. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642-43 (1993) ("classification 'must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification"' and "'the burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support
it"') (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993); Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981) (holding that Commerce Clause legislation can be
invalidated "only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that
the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends."); Lehnhausen v. Lake
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973).
98. See infra Part III.D(2) for an analysis of such situations.
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gations conducted to determine whether to take legislative action.
Such data become part of the legislative history of a piece of legislation and are found in a variety of places, ranging from committee reports to floor debate found in The Congressional Record. 99
Legislative history is considered by some to be suspect as a
method of indicating congressional intent. 100 However, the arguments
against the use of legislative history have no force where the court
only seeks a factual basis for legislation. If, for example, any conceivable basis for sustaining legislation will suffice, then the source of that
factual basis is irrelevant.
Therefore, the only distinction between facts found in the legislative history of a challenged statute and facts found in the statute itself
lies in how obscured those facts are. Some legislative histories are
straightforward; the relevant facts are easily identifiable. In such instances, there is no reason to treat such facts any differently than if
they had appeared in the legislation itself.
In contrast, some legislative histories are voluminous and difficult
to assemble. Where that is the case, advancement of the goals of legislative and judicial autonomy is compromised. Judicial autonomy is
hindered because courts have to expend great resources identifying
relevant facts. 10 1 Legislative autonomy is ill-served because courts
may overlook a critical fact buried in the history either due to the
sheer volume and confusion of a legislative history or because the
court's preferences color its ability to locate facts.
In sum, there is no analytic difference in the way in which empirical data appearing in a legislative history or the legislation itself
should be treated, yet practical differences, such as those identified
above, may weigh in the balance, yielding a different result.
99. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 24.
100. Some judges, notably Justice Scalia, find legislative history to be highly problematic. A common criticism of legislative history as a source for statutory interpretation is
that the intent of the legislature as a whole, if it can be ascertained at all, is not reflected in
committee reports or the recorded remarks of the handful of legislators who debate the
bill. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Kenneth W. Starr, ObservationsAbout the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L. J. 371,375
(1987). Further, it is argued that legislative history is manipulated by staff members who
deliberately insert material into committee reports that reflects their own views or even
those of lobbyists. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 88, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a thoughtful critique of Justice Scalia's position, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 439-44 (1988). For an
overview and generally supportive position of legislative history, see MIKVA & LANE, supra
note 24, at 775-85, 913-34 (providing a generally supportive overview of legislative history).
101. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1656 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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(4) Facts From Court and Counsel

Justice Breyer's dissent in Lopez details at great length precisely
how it might be that Congress could have had a rational basis for finding that gun-related school violence substantially affects interstate
commerce, through its effect on the quality of education. 10 2 In an Appendix to his opinion, 03 he lists well over 150 sources from which
Congress might have rationally made that finding, and the opinion itself spins, from that data, a strong web linking interstate commerce
with the federal regulation of guns. He carefully shows the epidemic
of guns in American high schools, 1°4 and the toll that takes on the
quality of education. 10 5 Justice Breyer then provides a detailed empirical basis to show that "[h]aving found that guns in schools significantly undermine the quality of education in our Nation's classrooms,
Congress could also have found, given the effect of education on interstate and foreign commerce, that gun-related violence in and around
school is a commercial, as well as a human, problem."'10 6 That which
Justice Breyer employs to illustrate the links described above, is
largely scientific fact. 07
The scientific facts describe the economic chain but do not tell
whether Congress was rational in concluding that those links were
substantial. To answer that question, Justice Breyer relies more heavily on precedent than on empirical data. He shows that the strength of
the economic links he has so carefully forged is no different than those
previously found by the Court to be substantial enough to withstand
08
scrutiny.
Justice Breyer's opinion pieces together, from empirical data, a
rational basis for Congress's decision. In so doing, it draws on facts
from a range of sources in order to support Congress's legislation. Extensive research such as that evidenced by his opinion is an example
of the judicial branch going to great lengths to put into effect the legislature's desires. As such it does not provide the legislature with the
impetus to clearly set forth the requisite basis for its legislation, and
102. Id.at 1658-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1665-71.

104. lId at 1659.
105.
106.
107.
Article.
108.

Id.

lId
A review of the accuracy of these scientific facts is beyond the scope of this
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1661-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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that places the future of the legislation in jeopardy. 109 In addition, it
places a drain on judicial resources.
There are a variety of extra-congressional sources from which the
court can receive facts. Such facts may come from the arguments of
counsel, testimony or depositions of witnesses or stipulations." 0 Facts
found extra-congressionally may not have been known to Congress.
A key issue in considering the efficacy of extra-congressional facts is
ensuring that they are not used as an excuse to alter political decisions. That would be a usurpation of the legislature's authority to
judge the relative weight of evidence, and provide a legislative solution to a given problem.
Although it is well within the court's responsibility to find facts,
that "responsibility ... certainly does not authorize [the court] to re-

solve conflicts in the evidence against the legislature's conclusion or
even to reject the legislative judgment on the basis that without convincing statistics in the record to support it, the legislative viewpoint
constitutes nothing more than . . . 'pure speculation.""" The reweighing of evidence raises different problems than independent fact
finding. The line between evidence which the legislature has considered and evidence which it has not is a bright one. Indeed, in Vance v.
Bradley, the Court noted that "the very admission that the facts are
arguable ...

immunizes from constitutional attack the congressional

'' 2
judgment represented by th[e] statute[.]
The courts are not free to reconsider scientific facts known by (or
knowable to) the legislature as a method of second-guessing the legislature's evaluation of those facts. 113 However, whether new evidence
is being introduced for the purpose of "re-weighing" or if that evi-

109. Indeed, although four members of the Supreme Court found Justice Breyer's
opinion persuasive, five did not. Alternatively, Justice Brayer's energetic research may
evidence his preference for upholding the legislation.
110. See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating,and EstablishingSocial Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. Rnv. 477,498-517 (1986)
(discussing the question of "what courts should do with empirical information").
111. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 393 U.S.
129, 138-39 (1968).
112. 440 U.S. 93, 112 (1979); accord FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2096, 2104 (1993). See also Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916) ("It
makes no difference that the facts may be disputed or their effect opposed by argument
and opinion of serious strength. It is not within the competency of the courts to arbitrate
in such contrariety.").
113. See infra Parts III.B(6), III.C (discussing the distinctions relevant to when a fact
was known or might have been known by the legislature or court).
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dence is being introduced to show that the evidence on which Congress relied is incorrect may simply be a matter of semantics.
A distinction between scientific and political facts is critical here.
Properly, scientific facts should not be re-examined to ascertain
whether the "correct" political decision was made. Rather, such facts
ought to be examined to determine whether they are correct or not.
Assuming they are correct-or at least conceivably correct-then the
political judgment must stand. If they are not correct (for example, if
new data shows them to be false), then the legislation no longer has a
114
rational basis-unless another rational basis can be constructed.
Although much can be made of the relative institutional fact-finding competence of the legislature as opposed to the judiciary, I am not
persuaded that the advantages or disadvantages distinctly tip the balance in favor of one branch. 115 The legislature has greater resources
than the judiciary to devote to fact finding, and considers the general
good of the country rather than the specific litigants before it. Further, legislators can study complex factual problems at great length,
weighing different studies and reports.
It is also the case that the legislature is a political body, sometimes motivated to use its fact-finding capabilities for political persuasion rather than scientific truth. And a "fact" found by the legislature
may reflect underlying bargains that bear no relation to any a scientific fact. The legislature is certainly the more democratic institution.
Legislators have a political obligation to solicit and consider perspectives beyond their own.1 16 When a legislature is not expert in an area,

it may invite experts to inform it or it may be informed by interested
117
experts in the form of lobbyists.
114. See infra Part III.C (discussing the role of facts that came to light subsequent to
the enactment of a challenged statute).
115. But see Monahan & Walker, supra note 110. Professors Monahan and Walker
argue cogently that courts can work efficiently and effectively with social science data.
They suggest criteria by which courts may gather and assess data, and rules for sharing with
counsel the data which will be relied upon in reaching a judicial decision. !d. at 495. The
authors conclude that judicial decisionmaking would benefit from some independent research into social science by judges. Id at 497.
116. That obligation stems from voter accountability. See supra text accompanying
notes 62-63.
117. Consider the ordering of political facts and scientific facts given by Francois Geny:
[Tihe strongest and most certain precepts of the law are those which spring directly from the nature of things without the intervention of some abstract concept, which in all cases cannot but deviate in some points from reality. On the
other hand, while sometimes it may appear useful to have recourse to concepts
and abstract "constructions" by the employment of these technical operations,
the judge must never forget that these take him outside of the realm of those

1758

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

On the other hand, the adversary system is also quite practiced at
finding facts. Courts identify scientific facts all the time. Although
the truth-seeking aspect of the adversary system is colored by the desire of litigants to win, that competitiveness also helps to control the
use of conclusory statements as facts, as can occur in the legislature.
Additionally, in the legislature, members may, consistent with their
political obligations, make bargains not to introduce detrimental facts
during a hearing. Such bargains in a trial would likely violate the ca118
nons of ethics.
Finally, it could be argued that the only parties represented in
court are the specific litigants, whereas the legislature looks to general
interests. However, where a federal law is challenged as unconstitutional, that argument carries less weight. In such a case the defendant
will most likely be represented by the United States Department of
Justice or Congress. In the process of defending the law, the public
interest will be attended to.
Ultimately it seems that for every argument favoring one branch
there is counter-argument supporting the other. However, there is
one area in which the judiciary is the less-favored branch, and that is
where political preferences enter into the judgment. 1 9 It is difficult to
examnine scientific facts without screening them through one's own
preference schemes. We know that judges bring with them, wherever
objective realities which alone should guide his judgment. He should guard
against believing himself bound by these concepts (except where the statutes
themselves adopt them) and never take them for more than scientific hypotheses,
which are no doubt capable of helping him in conducting his investigations but
are never to be taken as established realities. Therefore the needs of actual life
must never be sacrificed to mere concepts.
Geny, supra note 58, at 11.
118. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 62, at 214-15 (discussing the role of counsel in supplying the Court with "after-the-fact-rationalizations" for legislation). Justice Powell, in his
concurrence in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 653 (1974), seemed to
indicate that there is a distinction between after-the-fact rationalizations that are supportable in the record and those that are not. The inference I draw from this is that counsel
could supply after-the-fact rationalizations for a piece of legislation so long as there is some
factual support for them. But see THOMAS STEARNS ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL

44 (1963) ("The last temptation is the greatest treason: To do the right deed for the wrong
reason.").
119. But see William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion,and "The Progressof the Law",
10 CARDOZO L. REv. 3, 16 (1988); see generally Judith S. Kaye, The Human Dimension in
Appellate Judging: A Brief Reflection on a Timeless Concern, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1004
(1988) (discussing how "reason" and "passion" interact in appellate judging).
Even one favoring an activist judiciary might agree that, as a starting premise, the
legislature rather than the judiciary is the preferred branch for instituting political
preferences.
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they travel, those assumptions that make up their world. 20 We also
know that these assumptions dramatically alter the inclination of a
judge to find a scientific fact credible.' 21 But such assumptions are no
more acknowledged by judges than they are by other human beings. 122 Although making those political assumptions explicit may
guard against some of the problems enumerated above, it is hardly a
perfect solution. 2 3 It does, however, point out the critical need for
120. Of course, most judges, like most human beings, see their own views of public policy not as policy views but as eternal truth, the spirit of the common law, the
basic principles of Anglo-American liberty, or, more simply, as the law. We see
other people's eyes; but we never see our own. We see other people's prejudices;
our own prejudices we view as the teachings of experience. If we ever come to
see our own views as prejudices, they have, by that token, ceased to be prejudices
and have become hypotheses to be examined and confirmed or rejected. So it is
with metaphysics. Judges and non-judges who denounce metaphysics do not
thereby escape from metaphysics. Nor do they establish the truth of their own
metaphysical assumptions. All they establish is their unawareness of their own
basic assumptions.
There is a special reason why most judges will not willingly uncover, even in
the privacy of judicial chambers, their basic valuations. For the custom of the
realm and the defense of the status quo require that judges should appear to be
unsusceptible to the wayward gusts of human emotion. The law is supposed to be
objective, impersonal, and firmly grounded in the indubitable. On the other
hand, everybody knows-especially judges and lawyers and law professors-that
men's views of what is good and bad vary atrociously from place to place and
from year to year.
Perhaps one of the reasons why judges do not like to discuss questions of
policy, or to put a decision in terms upon their views as lawmakers, is that the
moment you leave the path of merely logical deduction you lose the illusion of
certainty which makes legal reasoning seem like mathematics. But the certainty is
only an illusion, nevertheless.
Felix Cohen, Field Theory, supra note 1, at 260-61 (citing Holmes, Privilege,supranote *,

at 7; HOLMEs,
121. Id.

COLLECTED PAPERS,

supra note 6, at 126).

122. RosEN, supra note 11, at 9-10 (attributing politically uncharacteristic votes of
Supreme Court Justices Taft and McReynolds to specialized knowledge that each held on
the issues).
123. For instance, we know that judges brought with them certain assumptions about
how long and hard women could work. Consider the rebuttal of that assumption advanced
by Louis Brandeis's famous brief for Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The brief was
rife with "bad science" that supported assumptions about women.
Woman is badly constructed for the purposes of standing eight or ten hours upon
her feet. I do not intend to bring into evidence the peculiar position and nature
of the organs contained in the pelvis, but to call attention to the peculiar construction of the knee and the shallowness of the pelvis, and the delicate nature of the
foot as part of a sustaining column. The knee joint of woman is a sexual characteristic. Viewed in front and extended, the joint in but a slight degree interrupts
the gradual taper of the thing to the leg. Viewed in a semi-flexed position, the
joint forms a smooth ovate spheroid. The reason for this lies in the smallness of
the patella in front, and the narrowness of the articular surfaces of the tibia and
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direction from the legislature as a method of curtailing judicial bias. It
is not always the case that the Court will work to support the legislature's political judgment as did Justice Breyer in his dissent in Lopez.
(5) Informally-Found Facts
Informally-found facts provide judges with no concrete factual
basis for challenged legislation. This form of fact gathering does not
leave the same sort of record that formal fact finding does; it may not
emerge during floor debate that a legislator has gathered data through
informal discussion. Since there is no record of such fact finding, a
court cannot review such facts to see if they tend to establish the required nexus. This makes it difficult to ascertain the actual basis on
which Congress reached its decision.
In his dissent in Lopez, Justice Souter stresses that:
The question for the courts, as all agree, is not whether as a predicate to legislation Congress in fact found that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce. The legislation implies
such a finding, and there is no reason to entertain claims that Congress acted ultra vires intentionally. Nor is the question whether
Congress was correct in so finding. The only question24is whether
the legislative judgment is within the realm of reason.'
Thus as far as the legal standard of review goes, Justice Souter articulates a rule of review that requires no distinctions to be drawn among
rational bases for Congress's legislative judgment. Because Congress's factual predicate to its legislation is implied, it need not be
stated explicitly. The courts are limited to determining whether such a
decision has a rational basis. Accordingly, it is not necessary to identify which facts Congress relied upon in deciding to legislate. Given
that, there is no distinction needed to be drawn among formally-found
facts and those found informally. Indeed, Justice Breyer, as discussed
earlier, weaves together a factual predicate for the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 that likely relies at least in part on facts informally
found by Congress. 125 Nevertheless, a practical distinction between
facts informally found and those formally found remains. Where Confemus, and which in man form the lateral prominences, and thus is more perfect
as a sustaining column than that of a woman.
Louis Brandeis & Josephine Goldmark, Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908), reprintedin AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 89, at 238. However, that bad science appealed to the judges' policy preferences. See Julius Cohen, LaborWelfare Cases, supra note 92, at 378-89.
124. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1656 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
125. Included in the Appendix to Justice Breyer's opinion are numerous House and
Senate reports. Id. at 1665-66.
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gress does not include formal findings of fact, as discussed earlier, it
places that responsibility on the reviewing court. As Lopez illustrates,
that may not be wise. Indeed, Lopez may well stand for the proposition that, in Commerce Clause cases, Congress must include formal
findings of fact in its legislation for it to withstand constitutional
challenge.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority does-not articulate a
distinction among various sources of facts either. However, he implies
a distinction. He notes that the court is obligated to consider as part
of its review those facts which are part of the formal record of legislation (and then points out that Congress made no such formal findings
of fact). 2 6 He does not categorically reject facts found informally.
The opinion refers to the use of facts drawn from prior legislative experience as "especially inappropriate here" but offers no guidance beyond that as to situations when they might be appropriate. 27 Nor
does he address the use by Justice Breyer of facts drawn from sources
other than those expressly offered by the Congress that enacted the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. 28 Without further guidance, we
are left with the practical distinctions between formally and informally
found facts that are identified above.
If legislative autonomy is paramount to enforcing the will of the
legislature, informal-fact finding makes the goal of respecting the legislature's autonomy quite difficult. Indeed, it argues forcefully for the
need for formal re-creation of informal fact finding.
A court reviewing legislation based on informal fact finding will
have to either construct a factual nexus or declare that one is not present. 29 In either case, it will be drawing from either its own stock of
facts, or those presented to it by counsel, rather than the law itself.
Moreover, some very real problems stem from the facts independently
being gathered by the court or offered by counsel. This is true regardless of how it has come about that the court or counsel are offering
facts. Once Congress has left a hole in its legislation and legislative
history, either through complete silence or through the creation of a
record too sparse for a court to read, the identification of a nexus
126. Id. at 1631-32.
127. See infra Part III.B(6) (discussing facts drawn from prior legislative experience).
128. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633-34. That is not to say the majority opinion does not
address the argument formed out of those facts by Justice Breyer in his dissent.
129. In the latter event, the court may find the legislation unconstitutional, see, e.g.,
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), or it may remand the case to a lower court in order that
factual findings may be conducted, see, e.g., Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543
(1924).
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must be made by a participant in the legislative process other than the
enacting congress. That party might be a subsequent congress, the reviewing court, another court in a precedential decision, or counsel
130
presenting briefs in the case or arguing it.
(6) Facts Drawn From PriorLegislative Experience
A variation on the informal fact finding mentioned above is
where the legislature has general knowledge in the area in which it is
legislating, especially when such general knowledge comes from facts
131
gathered in the process of working on previous similar legislation.
It has been said that "[1]egislation develops in an orderly manner. It
finds analogy in prior legislative enactment. Unique is the occasion
when completely new legislation is enacted."'1 32 Congressional expertise may come from prior legislation for which formal facts were
found. Those facts may have been included in the prior legislation or
its legislative history. If this is the case, laws based on this expertise
should not pose a significant problem for a reviewing court. It is as
easy to assess an old House Report as a new one.
However, this approach raises the question of whether the old
House Report is a relevant source of facts to establish a nexus linking
the new legislation with the requisite congressional authority.
As noted above, the majority in Lopez rejects the argument that
factual findings in previous legislation address the subject matter of
section 922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, or its relation to
interstate commerce. 133 In so doing, the Court agreed with the Fifth
Circuit decision in Lopez. There, the court found that:
Neither the act itself nor its legislative history reflect any Congressional[sic] determination that the possession denounced by section
922(q) is in any way related to interstate commerce or its regulation,
or, indeed, that Congress was exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause. Nor do any prior federal enactments or Congressional[sic]findings speak to the subject matter of section 922(q) or its
130. See supra Part III.B(4) (discussing the problems arising from court and counsel
being the source of facts).
131. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("After
Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national concern, its Members gain experience that may reduce the need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress
again considers action in that area.") See also United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 29394 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 503), vacated and remanded, 115 S.Ct.
1819, rev'd on remand, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 10425 (9th Cir. May 11, 1995).
132. Frank Edward Horack, Jr., The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IOWA L. REv.41
(1937), reprintedin MORRIS R. COHEN & FELIX S. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 491, 494 (1951).

133.

United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995).
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relationship to interstate commerce. Indeed, section 922(q) plows
thoroughly new ground and represents a sharp break with the longstandingpattern of federal firearms legislation.134

Consider what the Ninth Circuit wrote in Edwards:
Where Congress has made an express finding in relation to the challenged regulation and states explicitly that the activity has an impact
on interstate commerce, a reviewing court's responsibility to determine whether a reasonable Congress would have found such nexus
is simplified. . . . Where, as here, however, Congress in adopting
earlier legislation has found that the activity sought to be regulated
affects interstate commerce,
135 additional hearings and findings on this
question are unnecessary.
The Ninth Circuit split with the Fifth Circuit on the question of
whether the facts gathered for prior legislation are relevant to establishing a nexus with interstate commerce for the legislation at issue.
Again, where the legislature has not engaged in formal-fact finding, it is placing itself at the mercy of the reviewing court. Although
the test for reviewing legislation like the Gun-Free School Zones Act
is set forth in Lopez, it is extremely difficult to reliably identify when
the reviewing court has abused its discretion in rejecting as irrelevant
136
factual findings from prior legislative enactments.
When examining the legislative history of an act other than the
one being challenged, courts may have to comb through a great deal
of material in order to piece together a coherent factual basis. In such
a case, it can be difficult for a court to know whether the facts in a
particular legislative history are relevant to the challenged statute.
And where the court is constructing factual bases for the legislature,
legislative autonomy-however defined-is impinged. Where the legislature's motivations are unclear, it is difficult to craft a rule respecting its political decisions.137
134. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1366 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995) (emphasis added).
135. United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291,295 (9th Cir. 1993), vacated and remanded,
115 S. Ct. 1819, rev'd on remand, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 10425 (9th Cir. May 11, 1995)
(emphasis added).
136. See discussion supra Part I.B.
137. Albeit in a different context, a similar argument has been advanced by Justices
Brennan, Powell, Marshall and Stevens. They have argued that, where Congress has not
articulated legitimate objectives, the Court should not simply accept any "conceivable basis" articulated by government attorneys as an explanation of congressional purpose.
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 244-45 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan,
Marshall & Stevens, JJ.) ("In my view, the Court should receive with some skepticism post
hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose, unsupported by the legislative history. When no
indication of legislative purpose appears other than the current position of the Secretary
[of Health and Human Services], the Court should require that the classification bear a
'fair and substantial relation' to the asserted purpose."); United States R.R. Retirement
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The chief concerns driving this analysis are maintaining congressional autonomy and continuing the vitality of judicial review, while
restricting the role of judicial preferences in that review process.
Given this, the ability of prior legislative histories to inform courts as
to congressional intent presents a dilemma. Factual findings drawn
from prior legislative experience may not offer courts any guidance in
determining whether the prior findings are relevant facts to the subsequently-enacted, challenged legislation. 138 As such, the judiciary may
be required to expend a great deal of effort constructing a factual
nexus. It cannot simply rubber stamp the legislation, even rational
basis review carries certain minimal obligations. Yet, if the reviewing
court fails to identify a factual basis for the legislation, then legislative
autonomy may be impinged upon if those prior legislative facts were
indeed relevant. 139
C. Subsequently Gathered Facts
Facts gathered after the enactment of the challenged legislation

may come from the reviewing court, counsel arguing the case, or a
legislative action that is taken subsequent to the passage of the chal140
lenged law.

Subsequently-enacted legislation comes in a variety of forms.
First, Congress might re-enact a piece of legislation, but with different
facts in it. Assuming the facts added to the re-enacted legislation are

now sufficient to provide a rational basis, the only problem remaining
has to do with those prosecuted under the legislation that did not inBd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 188 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). That argument has never
commanded a majority of the Court, and has been characterized as a method of tightening
the scrutiny of the legislation. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1446 n.21.
138. Facts relevant to the construction of a nexus are sometimes "found" as a matter of
law in prior judicial decisions. For example, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 579-84 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995), made certain findings with respect to minority programming that should have
served as precedent for the D.C. Circuit when it considered Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d
382, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Recent Case, supra note 8, at 807.
139. Indeed, a reviewing court may not re-weigh facts that were considered by a legislature in arriving at a decision. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111-12 (1979).
140. "[A] purely informational void could be filled by evidence in court of the same
general kind that might have been presented to a congressional committee or the like concerning any relationship between the legislation and interstate commerce. However, in
such a situation the court could only guess at what Congress's determination would have
been." United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1364 n.44 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995).
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clude the relevant facts. 141 Second, it is possible that a subsequentlyenacted statute might contain factual findings that establish a nexus
for a prior, challenged statute. Such an instance is analytically similar
to employment of legislative history of another act. Finally, Congress
could amend an earlier law by "adding" facts to it. Indeed, Congress
took that action when it included in the Omnibus Crime Bill factual
findings that amended the Gun-Free School Zones Act.142 Congress
141. This presents a paradoxical situation that must ultimately be resolved in favor of
those prosecuted under the Act. The paradox is that if a law is able to withstand constitutional challenge because any rational basis will support it, and if no such basis could have
been constructed prior to the subsequent legislation, then the law should not have been
enforced. But, as the subsequent legislation now exists, bringing with it a rational basis,
then the law ought to be upheld. Such a paradox only exists in cases, like that of the GunFree School Zones amendment, where the facts are not new but were not known to the
reviewing court prior to the amendment.
142. S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The
amendment reads as follows:
§ 2972. GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES. (a) Amendment of Title 18, United
States Code. § 922(q) of Title 18, United States Code, is amended - (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), respectively; and (2) by inserting after "(q)" the following new paragraph:
"1) The Congress finds and declares that"(A) crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a pervasive, nationwide problem;
"(B) crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement of
drugs, guns, and criminal gangs;
"(C) firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and have
been found in increasing numbers in and around schools, as documented in numerous hearings in both the Judiciary committee of the House of Representatives
and Judiciary Committee of the Senate;
"(D) in fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, its component parts,
ammunition, and the raw materials from which they are made have considerably
moved in interstate commerce;
"(E) while criminals freely move from state to state, ordinary citizens and
foreign visitors may fear to travel to or through certain parts of the country due to
concern about violent crime and gun violence, and parents may decline to send
their children to school for the same reason;
"(F) the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a decline
in the quality of education in our country;
"(G) this decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact on interstate commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States;
"(H) states, localities, and school systems find it almost impossible to handle
gun-related crime by themselves; even states, localities, and school systems that
have made strong efforts to prevent, detect, and punish gun-related crime find
their efforts unavailing due in part to the failure or inability of other states or
localities to take strong measures; and
"(I) Congress has power, under the Interstate Commerce Clause and other
provisions of the constitution, to enact measures to ensure the integrity and safety
of the nation's schools by enactment of this subsection."
S.1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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did not re-enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act, it simply amended it
by adding factual findings, seemingly in response to the Lopez case.
That amendment was in the form of a factual nexus linking the
prohibition of weapons within school zones to the effect of such guns
on interstate commerce. 143 As a source of empirical data, subsequent
amendments of fact may be useful in determining what the present
Congress sees as the factual nexus. 144 If the only role of the empirical
data requirement is to factually link the legislation with Congress's
authority to legislate, then so long as the new facts were true at the
145
time of enactment, the legislation ought to be legitimate.
The Lopez Court seems to be divided about what to do with the
formal findings of fact that amend the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
Justice Rehnquist appears to discard them because the Government
does not rely upon them. 146 Justice Souter, in his dissent also treats
See also 139 CONG. Rc. S17154 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1993).
143. It is not particularly uncommon for Congress to amend the findings sections of a
statute. However, the form in which the amendment took place in the case of the GunFree School Zones Act is uncommon.
A search of the current U.S. Code has uncovered at least twenty-one instances where
Congress has amended the "findings" section of legislation. These can be grouped into
three categories: (1) minor changes that do not substantially affect the meaning of the
language (7 U.S.C. § 3191 (1985); 12 U.S.C. § 3701(a) (Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1994); 16
U.S.C. § 1531(a) (1993); 20 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1994); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1121(a) (Supp. 1994); 20 U.S.C. § 2391 (1991)); (2) amendments which reflect subsequent
changes in the scope of the legislation (16 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp.
1994); 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1994); 16 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (Supp.
1994); 16 U.S.C. § 2801(a) (Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1994); 20 U.S.C. § 1130(a) (Supp.
1994); 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1979); 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (1989); 42 U.S.C. § 4541(a) (1989); 42
U.S.C. § 5111(a) (Supp. 1994); 42 U.S.C. § 6861(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 10801(a) (Supp.
1994)); (3) amendments which reflect changes in the world or the passage of other legislation in a related area (15 U.S.C. § 4101(a) (Supp. 1994); 29 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1990); 42
U.S.C. § 6000(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 8201(a) (1989)).
144. Professor William Eskridge argues that subsequent legislative history is also useful
in determining what the enacting Congress saw. Interestingly, he observes that this is most
often the case where the Supreme Court is substantially more conservative than the Congress. William N. Eskridge, Jr., OverridingSupreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 402-403 (1991).
145. A problem may arise where a later congressional act is passed by a new Congress,
with new members. In such a case the validity of the original act, prior to the subsequent
recitation of facts is questionable. One solution would be to see if a majority of the members of Congress who voted for the original act are still serving in the later Congress, and
determine whether they voted for the bill with the new fact-finding. This solution is somewhat artificial but it may respond to those cases that arise in the period between the old act
and the new act with amended findings.
146. The sum treatment of the facts that appear in the subsequently enacted amendment appear in a footnote that reads, in full:
We note that on September 13, 1994, President Clinton signed into law the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
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the findings in a footnote. However, he "see[s] no reason not to consider Congress's findings, insofar as they might be helpful in reviewing
the challenge to this statute, even though adopted in later legislation."1 47 Ultimately he does not draw on the findings, characterizing
them as going "no further than expressing what is obviously implicit in
the substantive legislation, at such a conclusory level of generality as
to add virtually nothing to the record. 1 48
In theory, adoption of either of these techniques as a method of
communicating empirical data to a reviewing court discards any premium placed on the "intent" of the enacting legislature. Empirical
data located in legislation enacted subsequent to that under challenge
are simply general sources of empirical data. As such, they are not
reliable as empirical data known to the Congress that originally enacted the legislation. The arguments raised by Justice Rehnquist and
the Fifth Circuit in Lopez, against the applicability of facts drawn
from the legislation enacted priorto that challenged do not pertain to
facts found in an amendment to the challenged legislation. Nor does
it pertain to a re-enactment of the legislation under review. However,
such arguments are relevant to the use of facts found for legislation
that is enacted subsequently to that under review.
Justice Souter's view that facts found in subsequently-enacted
amendments may be a useful source of identifying a rational basis for
legislation is in harmony with the articulated goals of achieving legislative and judicial autonomy. Assuming that the subsequently-enacted factual findings are of some value (as was not the case in
Lopez), it seems apparent in such cases that the legislature rendered
its political judgment based on the facts it has set forth. Accordingly,
the job of the reviewing court is made easier by having the facts set
before it. Of course, and as is the case with any recitation of formally
found facts, it does not end the analysis for a reviewing court. It sim149
ply "help[s] with a hard job".
Stat. 1796. Section 320904 of that Act, id. at 2125, amends section 922(q) to include congressional findings regarding the effects of firearm possession in and
around schools upon interstate and foreign commerce. The Government does not
rely upon these subsequent findings as a substitute for findings in the first instance. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25 ("We're not relying on them in the strict sense of the
word, but we think that at a very minimum they indicate that reasons can be
identified for why Congress wanted to regulate this particular activity.").
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 n.4 (1995).
147. Ld. at 1656 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
148. Id. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text (discussing the use of scientific
facts, political facts and conclusory findings of fact).
149. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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False Facts: Testing the Methods

A separate problem is raised where the facts in the legislation are
false. 150 This problem crops up in a variety of instances. The facts
may never have been true. Alternatively, the facts might have once
been true but are no longer accurate.' 5' How does the empirical data
requirement work in these contexts? In such instances there is sufficient empirical data, but it is inaccurate.
(1) False Facts Understood as Approximations: "Some 43 million
Americans"

What if the factual basis of an act is false? In the loosest sense
this might arise where an exact figure is used that might be intended
to be an approximation. For example, the Americans With Disabilities Act states, in the section marked "Findings," that there are "some
43 million disabled Americans" in the United States. 52 Even without
150. "All rules of substantive law assume the existence of basic facts on which to operate. Let these facts be distorted ... and the result may be as harsh as if defective legal
principles were applied to agreed facts." Hubert W. Smith, Scientific Proofand Relations
of Law and Medicine, 10 U. CHI. L. REv. 243, 244 (1943).
151. For a discussion of what happens when the facts relied upon by Congress in passing the law are no longer "true," see Henry Wolf Bikle, JudicialDeterminationof Questions
of FactAffecting the ConstitutionalValidity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. Rnv. 6, 15-16
(1924). Commenting on Charleston Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924), Bikle notes that
"the Court regards it proper to consider evidence as to the underlying fact, as well as to
take judicial notice of such matters of fact as properly come within that power; and...
information derived from such evidence and from such judicial notice may be adequate to
overthrow a legislative finding of fact incorporated in the challenged legislation." Id at 16
(discussing Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 536
(1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154 (1921); and Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478,
486-87 (1914)).
Judge Linde argues that shifts in facts over time should not, in theory, affect judicial
review:
If responsible lawmaking is the premise of review, the purpose against which the
rationality of the means is tested must obviously be the purpose intended at the
time of enactment. It would make little sense to accuse past legislators of irrationality because the facts on which they acted have subsequently changed. ....
Legitimate ends and rational means must coincide at the time of the legislative
decision, if responsible lawmaking is the constitutional premise.
Linde, supra note 62, at 217.
152. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101(a)(1)
(Supp. V 1993)).
The 43 million figure is said to have been gathered from the following statistics (which
do not add up to 43 million):
-22 million people have hearing impairments,
-2 million people are deaf,
-120,000 people are totally blind,
-60,000 people are legally blind,
-2 million people have epilepsy,
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the qualifying "some", that statement would be understood to be an
approximation. Suppose that the statute simply asserted that there
were "43 million disabled Americans" in the United States and further suppose that there are not now, nor were there at any time since
the statute's enactment, 43 million disabled Americans in the United
States. Would that mean that the empirical data requirement has not
been met? Intuitively the answer is "no." The actual number of disabled Americans is not, within certain limits, a material or meaningful
factual predicate to the Americans With Disabilities Act. 5 3 The answer lies in the acknowledgment that we, as a society, do not place
great value on precision with respect to all factual predicates for
legislation.' 54
Within broad limits, the presentation of a number that does not
perfectly correspond to the factual finding included in the Act is irrelevant.' 55 Recognition that this number is incorrect-that a fact in the
-1.2 million people use wheelchairs,
-9.2 million people have developmental disabilities such as cerebral palsy,
-2.1 million people have speech impairments, and,
-2 million to 2.5 million people have mental retardation.
The Scope of PhysicalDisability in America-PopulationsServed (The National
Center for Medical Rehabilitation Research), reprinted in FROM ADA To EMPOWERMENT-WoRK: THE KEY TO OPPORTUNITY (distributed at the Meeting of
the President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, Radisson
Hotel, Wilmington, Delaware, Mar. 4, 1992). The National Institute on Mental
Health further estimates that there are 5 million people with mental illness. I&a
All of these disabilities would clearly meet the definitional requirements of "disability" within the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (1988 & Supp. II 1988).
Edward J. McGraw, Note, Compliance Costs of the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 18
DEL J. Co'. L. 521, 524-25 n.23 (1993).
153. That there are a large number of disabled Americans may be a material and
meaningful factual predicate. The precise number, however, is not.
154. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1362 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995).
We recognize, of course, that the imprecise and matter of degree nature of concepts such as "substantially," especially as applied to effect on interstate commerce, generally renders decision making in this area peculiarly within the
province of Congress, rather than the Courts. And, the Supreme Court has consistently deferred to Congressional findings in this respect, both formal findings in
the legislation itself and findings that can be inferred from committee reports,
testimony before Congress, or statutory terms expressly providing for some nexus
to interstate commerce.
Id.
155. See supra Part III.B. Where, when, and by whom the number is presented may be
relevant. For a fuller discussion of the review of legislation in the event of changing times
and changing facts, see Linde, supra note 62, at 215-20 (discussing the due process formula
in relation to formation of laws); see also Bice, supra note 48, at 1 (examining the possibility of "an intelligible rational basis standard" and the standards of behavior such a test
would impose on legislators and executive officials).
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legislation is false-is of little moment to Congress or the judiciary in
this case.
If the 43 million were not considered to be an approximation and
treated as such, a challenge would play out quite differently, but still
without great violence. Congress would likely respond by inserting
the word "some" or "approximately" before the 43 million. Thus, the
fact would be explicitly an approximation, and as such would be correct. But in the interim, the political autonomy of Congress would
have been impinged upon by a court that did not acknowledge an approximation. Under this scenario any ruling constitutionally requiring
an empirically demonstrable nexus, such as that in Lopez, could have
a dramatic effect on Congress. 156 The decision to allocate resources to
document precise numbers is a political one.' 57 For a court to reject
legislation because it fails to empirically establish some exact number
would amount to a usurpation of legislative function. For example, it
would be incredibly expensive to ascertain the precise number of disabled Americans there are in this country. Indeed, that is the primary
reason that any reader of the Act would know that the 43 million figure is intended to be an approximation.
Further evidence that the number is intended to be an approximation lies in recognizing that the benefit gained by procuring an exact number would be minuscule. 158 Whether the benefits outweigh
the costs is a legislative decision. Therefore, the judgment about
whether a precise number should be sought is for the legislature to
make. It involves allocation of resources to the solution of social
problems.
This analysis is also guided by a concern that the public be wellserved by the rules governing judicial review of empirical data establishing the constitutionality of legislation. The public is ill-served by
legislation based on falsehoods, intentional or otherwise. Similarly,
156. If Congress itself were required to supply the exact number, and it were not already inclined to do so, then its autonomy is infringed upon to an even greater degree. See
supra notes 83-85 for a discussion distinguishing between Congress's willing inclusion of
facts in its legislation and a judicially-imposed requirement that it do so. Of course, the
application by a court of such a test to these facts would only be legitimate if it was necessary to Congress's constitutional authority to legislate that such numbers be precisely correct. For the reasons discussed in the text, that is not the case here.
157. Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Limitations on the Uses of Behavioral Science in the
Law, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 71, 76-77 (1967) (noting how expensive scientific inquiry is,
and how law makers are concerned with "immediate, cheap and significant
decisionmaking").
158. MAX RADIN, LAW AS LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE 46-53 (1971) (describing near-heroic and infeasible efforts necessary to fully pursue facts).
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the public is ill-served by elaborate reconstructions of legislation by
the judiciary. By definition such decisions are undemocratic. Further,
they can be duplicitous, stretching or twisting statutory language to
suit a purpose that is not clearly evinced by the legislation itself. 159
It is hardly necessary that every decision made by the legislature
be supported by empirical data.16° Indeed such a rule would likely
encourage deception by creating a need for the legislature to manufacture data where none is available. 161 Nevertheless, when scientific
facts are available to the reviewing court, and they contradict the facts
upon which the challenged legislation rests, the reviewing court must
consider the discrepancy. A decision by the court to formally review a
factual discrepancy must be made in light of concerns about judicial
economy, as well as the boundaries between the judicial and legislative branches. 62 Of course, the court is not free to re-weigh evidence
as a method of second-guessing the political judgment of the legislature. 163 It is, however, appropriate for the court to determine whether
the legislature's judgment was based on scientific facts at the time of
the bill's enactment. 164

159. For an example of such cases interpreting statutes, see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976); United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The
clearest feature of this case is that it begins with an Act so mischievously vague that the
Government charged with its enforcement does not understand it, for some of its important assumptions are rejected by the Court's interpretation. The clearest feature of the
Court's decision is that it leaves the country under an Act which is not much like any Act
passed by Congress. Of course, when such a question is before us, it is easy to differ as to
whether it is more appropriate to strike out or to strike down.").
160. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637,2642-43 (1993); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 812 (1976) ("The State is not compelled to verify logical assumptions with
statistical evidence.").
161. See infra Part III.D(2) for an example.
162. A deliberate legislative choice to depart from an existing state of facts is justifiable. The reason why the law has become detached from reality is because it must be, at
least to some extent. But see RADIN, supra note 158, at vii-ix, 7-10 ("The profession of the
law in all its forms has never detached itself completely from the various kinds of human
activity out of which it grew. It is essential that no complete detachment ever takes
place.") IAL at ix. That is, if society is to move forward, the law must be aspirational. If it
is aspirational, then it is a recitation of goals, rather than a reflection of our present state.
163. See Bd. of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, Rock Island, Pac. R.R. Co., 393 U.S.
129, 139 (1968).
164. Judge Hans Linde dismissed arguments about the relevance of facts that come to
light since the enactment of the legislation, by pointing out that there is a need for closure
in the political process. "The Congress is not the Federal Trade Commission." Linde,
supra note 62, at 218.
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Undeniably False Facts: Anti Car Theft Act

Let us turn now to a more problematic example of legislation,
that which is based on true political facts but false scientific ones. The
Anti Car Theft Act, which contains the following factual finding, is a
case in point:
(b) FEDERAL COOPERATION TO PREVENT 'CARJACKING' AND MOTOR VEHICLE THEF.-In view of the increase
of motor vehicle theft with its growing threat to human life and to
the economic well-being of the Nation, the Attorney General... is
urged to work with State and local officials to investigate car thefts,
including violations of section 2119 of title 18, United States Code,
for armed carjacking .... 165
When that statute was challenged in United States v. Eskridge, the

District Court found that Congress was acting within its power under
the Commerce Clause.' 66 The court noted that "the language of the
statute, itself, includes the specific congressional finding that motor
vehicle theft poses an increasing threat to the 'economic well-being of
the nation' and, thereby, impacts on interstate commerce."167 Beyond
that "factual finding" the court also relied upon a House report for
this bill discussing auto theft more generally, finding that it has an
impact on interstate commerce through its imposition of increased
168
costs and insurance premiums on automobile owners.
Recall the standard of review required under the Commerce
Clause: "A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a
congressional finding that the regulated activity [substantially] affects
interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends."' 169 Now
consider what Professor Dwight L. Greene had to write about the
statute and its factual genesis. According to Professor Greene, car
thefts reached a plateau in 1990 and declined steadily through 1992,
the year in which the Anti Car Theft Act was passed. 170 Professor
165.
U.S.C.
166.
167.

Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (codified at 18
§ 2119 (Supp. V 1994)).
818 F. Supp. 259, 262 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
Id. at 261.

168. Id. at 261-62 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 851(I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829, 2831).
169. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981). Consistent with Lopez, I inserted
"substantially" into the Hodel test.
170. Dwight L. Greene, Naughty By Nurture: Black Male Joyriding-Is Everything
Gonna Be Alright?, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 73, 76 n.10 (1994) ("Nationally, the F.B.I.
reports that auto thefts plateaued in 1990 and have not increased in relation to the population since then.") (emphasis added) (citing 1991 UNIFORM CRIME REP. FOR U.S. 50 (1992);
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Greene explained why there was a sense that car thefts are on the rise,
although they were in fact decreasing:
[T]he media has seized upon joyriding and treated it as if it is at the
same level of seriousness as other car-related crimes such as car
theft or carjacking. Using the common links of cars and stereotypes, the media has created the impression of an epidemic of outof-control young Black men engaging in auto theft. This construction of reality relies on dramatic but decontextualized facts. The
incidents selected for presentation conform to dominant stereotypes
about young Black men, single Black mothers, and White women in
need of White male protection against a dangerous (Black) world.
Through their power to construct pictures of reality which are misleading, the media has both exaggerated the problem and confused

the issues.

Television virtually never reports that statistically, the overall
problem of stolen cars has leveled off and indeed, has actually declined in the Northeast in recent years. Nor does television mention
that car robberies have not been increasing recently in relation 17to1
the population, and only rarely result in physical harm to people.

If Professor Greene's analysis is correct, as I believe it is, Congress's factual findings regarding carjacking included in the Anti Car
Theft Act and its legislative history are media-driven racist visions.
Given that there are few things less rational than racism, how can this
legislation be considered rational? 172
see also Constance L. Hays, Driver Unhurt in Carjackingin Connecticut,N.Y. TirMEs, Nov.

7, 1992, at 23, 26 ("According to F.B.I. statistics ... [carjackings] have actually declined in
New York City, dropping from 2,298 in 1990 to 2,067 last year and 926 during the first six
months of this year."). For the purposes of this Article, I am assuming that the F.B.I.
statistics are accurate as reported. Such a statistic would be open to challenge through
litigation, but a discussion of the methods by which such facts would be challenged is beyond the scope of this Article.
171. Greene, supra note 170, at 75-76.
172. Consider the following observation recounted by Professor Patricia Williams:
I saw not long ago in a five-and-dime store: a huge bin of identically molded
plastic sets of mother and father dolls. Some dolls in the bin were priced at $ 3.99
a set. Others had been originally priced at $ 2.99, now marked down to the "Must
Sacrifice!" price of $ 1.99 a set. As a neutral market phenomenon, this obviously
makes little sense, and one would assume that a rational vendor would quickly
adjust one way or another for the discrepancy. As a less-than-neutral observer,
however, I should add that although all the dolls were obviously cast from the
same mold, they had not been privileged to share the same dye lot. The higherpriced dolls were white; the dolls priced for sacrificial sale were black. I was
struck by how central the information about color was to my analysis of this sitiiation: in a color-blind frame, the pricing was so irrational that I might comfortably
assume a laissez-faire approach, confident that market pressures would assure a
rapid adjustment. Knowing the dolls' color, however, exposed a more grim social
reality: the irrationality of racism not only perpetuated, but also made "rational"
by market forces.
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Historically there have been no distinctions drawn between scientific facts and political truths. Simply because car thefts are not on
the rise does not mean that they are not perceived to be a problem. In
other words, just because the factual finding in the Act is false as a
"scientific" fact does not negate its truth as a "political fact."
Although carjackings may be a tiny problem, they are nevertheless a
problem, that is (arguably) within the ambit of Congress's authority to
regulate under the Commerce Clause. 173 Certainly car thefts affect
insurance rates, which affects business. That in turn substantially affects interstate commerce. 174 So long as the court is able to construct
a rational basis for Congress to have acted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, the legislation will survive challenge under the Commerce
Clause.
A piece of legislation such as the Anti Car Theft Act, is engendered by a fear nurtured by stereotypes, racism and sexism. No
amount of data is able to dissuade those who feel that carjacking is on
the rise.175 If the only question asked was whether the legislature acted rationally in passing the bill, it should not be sustained as rational.
This, despite the fact that justified another way, it is likely within the
Commerce Clause power of Congress.
So long as incorrect facts included in the legislation are not
phrased in a way that their absolute verity is critical to the congressional action, and there is an independent rational basis for the congressional finding, then this legislation will likely be sustained. 176 And
undoubtedly a rational basis for the legislation could be articulated. 177
Patricia J. Williams, Comment: Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping In Singular
Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525, 543 (1990).

173. It is not entirely clear that, even if carjacking were on the rise in fact, Congress has
the authority to pre-empt state police power in this regard. United States v. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. 1624, 1650 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). In any event, the war between the federal
government and the states is beyond the scope of this Article.
174. Cf. United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
deaths of 750,000 people by firearms had a sufficient effect on insurance industry to place
gun control within the ambit of the Commerce Clause).
175. For a fascinating analysis of the importation of empirical data into judicial decision making, see Julius Cohen, Labor-Welfare Cases, supra note 92, at 414. Professor Cohen argues that an important aspect of the famous Brandeis-Goldmark briefs, which
presented the Court with reams of empirical data, was that the data showed how the legislation would benefit management's and business' property rights. See id. at 414-16. By
responding to the values of the Court, the impressive array of empirical data served as an
important motivating factor in the Court's decisions. See id. at 416.
176. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2104 (1993).
177. The most likely challenge to such an argument would come from those who carry
the banner for a reinvigorated Tenth Amendment or limited congressional power under
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Yet, the inclusion of the incorrect factual predicate-that car-jacking
is on the rise-is explicable by the irrational behavior of racism. 178
The resolution of such a conflict is not easy. At first blush, it
seems as though the response that is most protective of congressional
autonomy is one that permits the legislation to stand, regardless of its
resting, at least in part, on incorrect facts. One could argue that the
"tough love" view of congressional autonomy argues in favor of overturning the statute in order to discourage such sloppy legislation. And
because the statute rests on incorrect facts, less deference is owed to
the legislative body. But the diminution in deference is limited to the
extent to which the legislature has relied on the erroneous fact. Here,
Congress has pronounced that it is explicitly resting its legislation on
179
the erroneous fact that carjacking is on the increase.
On the other hand, the judiciary has a responsibility to uphold
legislation that has a rational basis.180 Unfortunately it may also rest
on an irrational basis; as noted earlier, "the very admission that the
facts are arguable ...immunizes from constitutional attack the con-

gressional judgment represented by th[e] statute."'' The presence of
an independent rational basis for finding that interstate commerce is
implicated by car thefts should not serve to mask a clearly irrational
motivation of the legislature. Such a holding has a deleterious effect
on the public at large. It strains credibility and legitimacy when the
legislature forces the courts to not only construct a rational basis for
the legislature's action under the Commerce Clause, but to construct
one that is large enough to hide its irrational error.
But it is extremely difficult to prove that, in passing a bill, Congress relied on any set of facts-true or otherwise. That recognition is
a part of the justification for the practice that where the facts are at
the Commerce Clause, and would thus see the Anti-Car-Theft Act as an encroachment on

traditional state activity.
178.

Greene, supra note 170, at 76 (having the media exaggerating the problem

through stereotypes of young black men).
179. See Anti-Car-Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, § 1, 106 Stat. 3384 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1992)) ("In view of the increase of motor vehicle theft with its growing
threat to human life and to the economic well-being of the Nation....").
The less explicit it is that legislation is built on a lie, the less the deference owed to the
legislature is diminished. For example, remarks found in legislative history, which indicate
reliance by Congress on a falsehood, are less reliable than findings included in the Act
itself, see supra Part II.B(3), and so would not erode the deference due to the legislature
to the same degree.
180. I am assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is another rational basis for
this legislation.
181. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112 (1979).

1776

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

least debatable, the legislative judgment relying on them will not be
overturned. However, there are other reasons for that rule. Congress
is the branch charged with making laws, and so deference is owed to it
in that process.
Where Congress announces its reliance on a set of facts, the difficulty in proving motive is eradicated. Motive is no longer an issue as
recognition of congressional autonomy mandates that, although Congress need not indicate what has motivated it, where it has, Congress
must be assumed to mean what it has said. Second, as discussed, the
deference owed to Congress diminishes when Congress acts in an irrational fashion. Finally, as a response to a self-avowedly, improperly
motivated legislature, a "floodgates" argument is, for the time being
at least, wholly unpersuasive. 1'
Although a full discussion of the problems with litigating the facts
upon which legislation rests is beyond the scope of this Article, 183 one
aspect of the fact-finding is of particular interest here, and that is an
examination of the institutional concerns related to the identification
and finding of facts by different bodies. Facts might be offered by
counsel in the case challenging the legislation, or the judge could offer
the facts through taking judicial notice of them. 184
182. It is likely that the more the judiciary entertains disputes about the factual basis of
the ends-means nexus, the more such suits will be brought. However, to the extent that the
increase in litigation is a problem, it seems to me that the body that should seek to correct
that is the legislature, not the judiciary.
In any event, at present, "debatable" facts do not create a cause of action. In evaluating the virtue of the litigation of these facts, it must be remembered that any case brought
by a plaintiff would be still subject to summary judgment.
183. For instance, there is some disagreement over whether a district court should conduct a trial or evidentiary hearing where the Commerce Clause is implicated. See Nat'l
Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1995). Cf id. at 1127 (no
trial) (Easterbrook, J.) with id. at 1133-34 (trial) (Rovner, J., concurring).
184. There seems to be no legal limitation on judges seeking facts independently. Nor
is there much guidance to courts as to how to gather, digest and utilize social science data.
See Monahan & Walker, supra note 110, at 486-88. Professors Monahan and Walker offer
a system for categorizing social science data as "fact" or "law" in order to assist courts in
better employing social science data.
In what ought to be an infamous case for other reasons, Quong Wing v. Kirkendall,
Justice Holmes delineated the duties of counsel and court. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223
U.S. 59 (1911). In Quong Wing, the Court heard a poorly-framed equal protection challenge to a Montana law imposing a license fee on "all persons engaged in laundry business
other than the steam, laundry business, with a proviso that it should not apply to women so
engaged where not more than two women were employed." Id. at 62.
Justice Holmes wrote for the majority:
If Montana deems it advisable to put a lighter burden upon women than upon
men with regard to an employment that our people commonly regard as more
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Where the facts are debatable' 8 5 -as is often the. case-the first
question that ought to be addressed is whether that debate went on in
the legislative arena, and if not, why not? As every bill that becomes
law passes through a notice and comment period, 186 plaintiffs will always have had at least a possibility of bringing their facts to the attention of the legislature. 187 To permit plaintiffs to raise arguments in
courts that were open to it to make before the bill became a law, is to
give those litigants two bites at the proverbial apple. Obviously, such
an argument assumes that these plaintiffs had access to the political
process. 88 As has been established, different groups have wildly varying access to the legislature. One cannot criticize a plaintiff for having
had two bites at an apple when that plaintiff has not yet gotten to the
table, let alone to the apple.
On a more conceptual level, there is another value that is often
set aside in lawmaking, and that is the value of truth, of facts, as opposed to fiction. This value is most important insofar as the public is
concerned. Those within the legal system have adapted to the myriad
appropriate for the former, the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere by
creating a fictitious equality where there is a real difference ...
... It is a matter of common observation that hand laundry work is a widespread occupation of Chinamen in this country while on the other hand it is so
rare to see men of our race engaged in it that many of us would be unable to say
that they ever had observed a case. But this ground of objection was not urged
and rather was disclaimed when it was mentioned from the Bench at the argument. It may or may not be that if the facts were called to our attention in a
proper way the objection would prove to be real. But even if when called to our
attention the facts should be taken notice of judicially, whether because they are
only the premise for a general proposition of law. . . or for any other reason, still
there are many things that courts would notice if brought before them that beforehand they do not know. It rests with counsel to take the proper steps, and if
they deliberately omit them, we do not feel called upon to institute inquiries on
our own account. Laws frequently are enforced which the court recognizes as
possible or probably invalid if attacked by a different interest or in a different
way.
Id. at 63-64.
185. Any discussion of the facts underlying legislation assumes that "scientific facts"
are debatable.
186. There are a number of notice-giving steps along the way from the time a bill is
introduced in the House of Representatives until it passes the Senate and then becomes alaw. For a detailed descriptions of the House-side procedures, see TIEFER, supra note 56, at
240-250.
187. Here I am not considering facts learned subsequent to the passage of legislation.
188. "[Tlhe Constitution presumes that, as long as the groups involved have a fair
chance to fight in the political arena, the democratic process will right itself." Beach Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 959 F.2d 975,988 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 113 S.
Ct. 2096 (1993) (Mikva, CJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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of legal fictions incorporated into the law. 189 It is not so clear to those

outside of the system. 190 Where plaintiffs have evidence to show that
those facts upon which legislative judgments rest are incorrect, they
must be given a forum in which to be heard.
In conclusion, the principles guiding the analysis in this Article
dictate that where the legislature explicitly relies on scientific facts
that are incorrect, it must be given no deference. The determination

that those facts are incorrect is one that will inevitably be made in
court.
There is a certain irony to this solution as it both encourages and
discourages the legislature from including facts in legislation. It encourages the inclusion of more carefully screened facts in order to
avoid the embarrassment of litigation. At the same time, it discourages inclusion of facts where those findings are not critical and where
the legislature might imagine that the court holds the same "sense" of
facts as it does. For example, in the Anti Car Theft Act but for the
incorrect fact, it is unlikely that a court would have a problem with
that statute.' 9'
E. No Facts

The final response to the empirical data requirement is for Congress to offer no factual justification whatsoever for its legislation.
The rationale for this reaction is twofold. The first might be best ex-

plained as an attempt by the Congress to retain control over its process. In essence, the Congress would be offering no factual
justification for its legislation, and saying to the courts: take it or leave

it. We are not going to let your review process dictate our lawmaking
189. See supra note 74.
190. For a discussion of the tendency of law theorists to divorce legal theory from reality, see Felix Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 13, at 810-11. Felix Cohen describes the problem from both sides of hell: the theoretician who ignores reality by
identifying rules without reference to reality and the theoretician who pretends as though
there are responses, drawn from empirical observations, to questions like "where a corporation is, when it incorporates in one state and has agents transacting corporate business in
another." Id. To that question, Cohen observes, "[n]obody has ever seen a corporation."
Id. at 811. Any attempt to answer the jurisdictional question by reference to empirical
observation is, to Cohen, the equivalent of adding another voice to the debate over how
many angels may dance on the head of a pin. You cannot "thingify" a corporation sensibly.
It is a social construct and must be treated as one.
191. It is virtually not imaginable that the statute would be overturned for the incorrect
fact. The factual findings in the Anti-Car-Theft Act are likely understood as impressions of
the crime problem. In this sense, they are akin to the view that many are doubtless of the
number of disabled Americans included in the Americans With Disabilities Act. See discussion supra Part III.D.

August 1995]

THE POLITICS OF FACTS

process. And where the statutes are not enforced as Congress intended, Congress can "overrule" the Court by passing new legislation.192 Such a stance protects Congressional autonomy in that it
offers no compromise. It may, however, be protecting Congressional
autonomy to a degree that is counterproductive. As discussed, the
courts apparently need some guidance in making a constitutional determination. Failure to supply that guidance may well result in misconstrued legislation or statutes not found constitutional. Such a
result is as harmful to the public as it is unlikely to be adopted by
Congress. 193 Such a response improperly assumes a certain indifference to result on the part of Congress.
An alternate reason why Congress might remain silent as to the
factual basis of legislation may be that the legislation is not based on
any scientific facts. Some congressional solutions to problems are
guesses at the best way to handle a problem. Sometimes few scientific
facts inform the solution to a problem. This complete lack of empirical data does not necessarily mean that the legislation at issue should
be held unconstitutional. Legislation that is essentially experimental
has been upheld despite a lack of scientific facts or even a cohesively
articulated political goal. 9 4 In such instances, the legislature is presumed to be drawing upon its experience legislating in analogous settings, rather than upon the available empirical data about the subject
of the present legislation.195
192. See supra note 144.
193. The deliberative process and voter accountability serve as powerful restraints
against such behavior by the legislature.
194. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2643 (1992) (a "'legislative choice is not subject to
courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence
or empirical data."' (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. 2096,2098 (1993)).
See generally KnREiraE, supra note 61, at 61-103 (discussing legislating in the face of uncertain information).
195. Among the staunchest supporters of predictive legislation were Justices Brandeis
and Holmes, who railed against interference with the legislature's power to conduct social
experiments.
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social
experiments that an important part of the community desires, in the insulated
chambers afforded by the several states, even though the experiments may seem
futile or even noxious to me and to those whose judgment I most respect.
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis spoke often of the virtues of experiment:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences
to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
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Where there are no facts, the rational basis standard of review all
but commands the reviewing court to supply a factual basis for the
law. The problem with such an arrangement, as discussed earlier, is
that where the court has little guidance from the legislature, fortuity
and preference may rule the day, which hobbles legislative autonomy.
When the legislation and its record provide no scientific facts, because
there are none, the court must stand at its most deferential. Here the
legislature is acting in its most political capacity: making a political
judgment based on political facts. Such deference does not require
the judiciary to sacrifice any of its goals. A reviewing court can examine the underlying facts, if any, to ascertain whether they are "correct" but if there are no underlying facts, it must, except at the
extremes, yield to the judgment of the legislature. 19 6

IV.

Conclusion: We Are the Source of the Law

In this Article, I have analyzed the role played by scientific and
political facts in the process by which Congress makes laws and the
judiciary reviews them. Up until recently, this area has been largely
ignored. As a consequence, major legislation has been enacted without what federal courts may consider to be a proper factual
foundation.
There is no definitive answer to the question about who, between
the legislature and the judiciary, has the power to control the legislative process. I have tried to make explicit those reasons why each
branch is entitled to be autonomous. In doing so, the Article has identified those areas where the legislature is entitled to deference and
those where it has forfeited that distinction. In recognizing that deference in the grey area of judicial review of the factual basis of legislation is not an absolute entitlement, each branch can begin to moderate
its behavior in a way that is respectful of, and works towards accomplishing, the overall goal of preserving the constitutional balance of
power between the branches.
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This
Court has the power to prevent an experiment ....
But, in the exercise of this
high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal
principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be
bold.
THE WORDS OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS 77 (S. Goldman ed. 1953).
196. This is not to say that reliance by the legislature on political facts insulates the
legislature from judicial review, or from challenges rooted in other constitutional
provisions.
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This Article has offered a set of guiding criteria by which Congress and the judiciary may make decisions about lawmaking and judicial review of political and scientific facts. Key among those decisions
is the recognition of the essential distinctions between scientific and
political facts. By reviewing the various sources of facts-political and
scientific-as recommended in this Article, we can move towards a
process of lawmaking that will better serve the public.
Finally, this Article is about choices and the process by which
those choices are made. It is impossible to make reliable decisions
based on incorrect facts. That observation is as true for a legislature
seeking to solve problems by enacting laws, as it is for a judiciary reviewing those laws for constitutionality, and for the public being ruled
by these laws.

